International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate by Grinberg, Itai
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2018 
International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the 
Current Debate 
Itai Grinberg 
Georgetown University Law Center, itai.grinberg@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2118 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275737 
 
Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate 
(October 29, 2018) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
 WORK IN PROGRESS – COMMENTS WELCOME 
  
 i 
International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption:  Analyzing the Current 
Debate 
 
Itai Grinberg 
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Abstract 
 
The “taxation of the digital economy” is currently at the top of the global international tax 
policymaking agenda.  A core claim some European governments are advancing is that 
user data or user participation in the digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital 
receipts, new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary apportionment factor in a 
future formulary regime targeted specifically at the “digital economy.”  Just a couple years 
ago the OECD undertook an evaluation of whether the digital economy can (or should) be 
“ring-fenced” as part of the BEPS project, and concluded that it neither can be nor should 
be.   
 
Importantly, concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital economy does 
not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system requires reform.  
The practical reality appears to be that all the largest economies have come to agree either 
that a) there is something wrong with the taxation of the “digital economy,” or b) there is 
something more fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current international tax 
system given globalization and technological trends.  
 
This paper is intended as a limited exploration of the second (or third, or fourth) best.  It 
analyzes three policy options that have been discussed in general terms in the current 
global debate.  First, I consider whether “user participation” justifies changing profit 
allocation results in the digital economy alone.  I conclude that applying the user 
participation concept in a manner that is limited to the digital economy is intellectually 
indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist ring-fencing.  Moreover, at the technical 
level user participation faces all the same challenges as more comprehensive and 
principled proposals for reallocating excess returns among jurisdictions.  Second, I 
consider one such comprehensive international tax reform idea, loosely referred to by the 
moniker “marketing intangibles.”  This idea represents a compromise between the present 
transfer pricing system and sales or destination-based reforms to the transfer pricing 
regime.  I conclude that splitting taxing rights over “excess” returns between the present 
transfer pricing system and a destination-based approach is complex, creates new sources 
of potential conflict, and requires relatively extensive tax harmonization.  This conclusion 
applies equally to user participation and marketing intangibles.  If such a mechanism were 
nevertheless pursued, I suggest that a formulary system for splitting the excess return is 
the most manageable approach.  Third, I consider “minimum effective taxation” ideas.  I 
conclude that, as compared to the other two policy options discussed herein, minimum 
effective taxation provides a preferable path for multilateral cooperation.   
 WORK IN PROGRESS – COMMENTS WELCOME 
  
 ii 
Table of Contents 
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 1 
Part I.  Background ..................................................................................................... 3 
IA.  The Decline of the Arm’s Length Standard ..................................................... 3 
IB.  The Relationship Between the Arm’s Length Standard, Jurisdiction to Tax, 
and the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments ................................... 7 
IC.  The Rise of International Tax Unilateralism and the Push to Tax Big Tech ... 9 
ID.  US Tax Reform, the BEAT and the GILTI ................................................... 13 
ID.1.  GILTI ...................................................................................................... 14 
ID.2.  The Relationship between GILTI and the Digital Tax Debate ............... 15 
ID.3.  BEAT ...................................................................................................... 16 
Part II.  Value Creation and User Participation ........................................................ 19 
Part III.  Where We Go from Here:  Destination-Based Income Tax Reform?........ 25 
IIIA.  Background:  The Destination-Based Residual Profit Allocation .............. 25 
Comparison of DBRPA with Sales-Based Formulary Apportionment ............ 27 
IIIB.  Destination-Based Residual Marketing Profit Allocation ........................... 28 
IIIB.1.  Dividing a Residual Return Between Marketing-Based and Other 
Intangibles ......................................................................................................... 30 
IIIB.1.a.  A “Two Sided” Valuation Solution? ............................................. 32 
IIIB.1.b.  A Relative “Capitalized Expenditure” Approach? ........................ 33 
IIIB.1.c.  A “One-Sided” Valuation Solution? ............................................. 34 
IIIB.1.d.  A “Formulary DBRMPA” Solution? ............................................ 36 
IIIB.2.  Problems with Relying on Destination for Income Tax Purposes ....... 38 
IIIB.2.a.  Inapplicability of VAT Best Practices ........................................... 39 
IIIB.2.b.  Known Solutions Building on Income Tax Administrative 
Concepts Are Insufficiently Robust .............................................................. 41 
IIIB.2.c.  Other Methods of Identifying Destination .................................... 42 
IIIB.2.d.  Relationship Between FDII and any Destination-Based Allocation 
System ........................................................................................................... 42 
IIIB.3.  Problems with Unitary Approach ......................................................... 43 
IIIB.4.  Conclusions re DBRMPA .................................................................... 44 
Part IV.  Pairing Inbound and Outbound Minimum Taxes? ..................................... 44 
IVA.  Outbound Minimum Taxes ......................................................................... 45 
Relationship of Outbound Minimum Taxes to German Royalty Barrier ......... 48 
IVB.  Inbound Minimum Taxes ............................................................................ 48 
The BEAT that Could Be:  A Reverse CFC Rule ............................................. 49 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 53 
 
 WORK IN PROGRESS – COMMENTS WELCOME 
  
 1 
 
Introduction1 
 
For the upcoming University of Chicago Federal Tax Conference, I was asked to write a 
paper “discussing what the US position should be and how the US tax rules should be 
changed (or not) in reaction to European tax changes such as the proposed gross tax on 
digital receipts, the digital PE, and the diverted profits tax.”   
 
A core tax policy claim some European governments are advancing is that user data or user 
participation in the digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital receipts, new profit 
attribution criteria, or a special formulary apportionment factor in a future formulary 
regime.  One fundamental question these claims raise is whether there is anything unique 
about the digital economy.  In the BEPS project the OECD undertook an evaluation of 
whether the digital economy can (or should) be “ring-fenced,” and concluded that it neither 
can be nor should be.  But the OECD’s conclusion is not stopping some European 
governments from pursuing proposals that attempt to apply special tax regimes to a limited 
set of digital businesses.2 
 
Importantly, simply concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital 
economy does not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system 
requires reform prompted in part by the digitalization of the economy.  Indeed, a debate 
about this question is ongoing at the OECD.  We know more about the contours of that 
debate today than we did when I was first asked to undertake this paper.  The practical 
reality appears to be that all the largest economies have come to agree either that a) there 
is something wrong with the taxation of the “digital economy,” or b) there is something 
more fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current international tax system in an 
era of globalization and digitalization.3  Government representatives have now made this 
plain in multiple public forums.  So, one way or the other, we lack a stable status quo. 4   
 
                                                 
1 I thank Pamela Olson and Michael Plowgian for comments on an earlier draft.  Oscar Velutini provided 
excellent research assistance.  Any errors are my own.   
2 See, e.g., HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax (Oct 29. 
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2172/DST_web.pdf 
3 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Tax Challenges Arising from 
Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018 (2018), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/content/publication/9789264293083-en; remarks of Brian Jenn at OECD-USCIB 2018 tax 
conference (all major economies believe either the first or the second of the options).  Stephanie Soong 
Johnston, Official Previews Coming OECD Digital Economy Work, 90 Tax Notes Int’l 1329 (June 11, 2018). 
4 For instance, David Bradbury of the OECD suggested the question of whether issues in the international 
tax system were limited to the “digital economy” or were more pervasive was at the core of the current OECD 
debate in his remarks at the International Fiscal Association [IFA] annual conference in Seoul in September.  
See Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Makes Headway on Long-Term Answers to Tax Digital Economy, 91 
Tax Notes Int’l 1164 (Sept. 10, 2018); Stephanie Soong Johnston, News Analysis: Geeking Out: Digital 
Taxation Debate Goes Viral at IFA Congress, 92 Tax Notes Int’l 19 (Oct. 1, 2018). 
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 2 
This paper sets out some considerations for US international tax policymaking and 
international tax diplomacy in this uncertain environment.  To that end, Part I briefly 
describes four disparate background considerations that should inform our thinking.  Part 
IA describes the decline of the arm’s length standard, which underpinned our historic 
understandings about how to attribute profits as among entities within a multinational 
corporation.  I argue that internationally the arm’s length standard as we knew it before the 
BEPS project is largely gone, and has been replaced by an unsustainable concept for profit 
attribution that I label the “bourgeois labor theory of value.”  Part IB describes the 
relationship between the arm’s length standard, jurisdiction to tax, and the attribution of 
profits to permanent establishments.  It highlights that under OECD principles, attribution 
of profits to permanent establishments is accomplished through application of the OECD’s 
transfer pricing guidelines.  Part IC recounts various acts of tax unilateralism abroad, often 
focused on the tech sector, and including the trend towards abandoning historic limits on 
jurisdiction to tax.  Part ID describes the United States’ 2017 tax reform in that global 
context, with a particular focus on the GILTI and the BEAT.    
 
The remainder of the paper is intended as an exploration of the second (or third, or fourth) 
best.  For purposes of this paper, I therefore do not analyze options that were considered 
and rejected in the most recent US tax reform, including a destination-based cash flow tax 
or an integrated corporate tax system, and certain options that never made it into the most 
recent tax reform debate, such as adopting a VAT.   
 
The discussion is instead limited to three options that have been discussed in general terms 
in the current global debate.  Each of these options preserves a classic corporate tax system 
that includes an entity-level tax on the normal return to capital.  One further important 
caveat is that in this paper I attempt as best I can to fill in ideas that have been described 
with a very high level of generality with additional potential content, in order to motivate 
the analysis.   
 
Part II focuses on the European Commission and Her Majesty’s Treasury (“HMT”) stated 
view that user participation should be acknowledged as a source of value creation in the 
digital economy and concludes that the user participation concept has application well 
beyond the so-called digital economy.  Applying the concept in a manner that is limited to 
the digital economy is intellectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist ring-
fencing.   
 
The user participation theory does, however, have an important relationship to other more 
generally applicable proposals for international tax reform.  In particular, it involves a shift 
towards destination-based income taxation, in much the same manner as some other 
proposals for fundamental international income allocation reform, albeit only for one 
sector.   
 
At least two more comprehensive and principled proposals to reform the international tax 
system’s attribution of profits are apparently now being considered at the OECD.  These 
respectively are often loosely referred to by the monikers “marketing intangibles” and 
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 3 
“minimum taxation.”  As publicly described, these ideas seem to be at an early stage of 
development.   
 
Part III evaluates a version of the “marketing intangibles” idea which I label the 
destination-based residual market profit allocation (“DBRMPA”).  Part IV evaluates a 
version of a minimum tax system that combines inbound and outbound measures, and 
which I label “minimum effective taxation.”   
 
Part III builds on the discussion about “where we go from here” in transfer pricing provided 
by Andrus and Oosterhuis in a paper for the 2016 University of Chicago conference.  The 
DBRMPA is related to that conference discussion of two years ago.  In particular, it 
represents a compromise between the present transfer pricing system and sales or 
destination-based reforms to the transfer pricing system described in the 
Andrus/Oosterhuis paper.  Part III concludes that splitting taxing rights over “excess” 
returns5 between the present transfer pricing system and a destination-based approached is 
complex.  It creates new sources of potential conflict as between sovereigns and as between 
sovereigns and multinationals.  Moreover, some destination specification problems for 
which solutions do not exist or at least are not widely known would need to be addressed.  
Finally, the DBRMPA likely requires extensive tax harmonization and information 
exchange; more so than a minimum tax approach.  Importantly all of the above conclusions 
regarding a DBRMPA apply with equal rigor as technical critiques of user participation.  
The difference is simply that a DBRMPA applies to the whole economy and therefore – 
unlike user participation – has some principled basis.  If a DBRMPA were pursued, Part 
III suggests that a formulary mechanism for doing so is the least technically challenging 
approach. 
 
Part IV builds on the discussion of the GILTI and the BEAT in Part I as well as other 
discussions of the pros and cons of those provisions in tax forums over the last year.  Part 
IV postulates that there may be a more sensible path for multilateral cooperation around 
minimum effective taxation.  This approach could be both responsive to the current global 
international tax debate and build on (and help repair) our 2017 international tax reform.  I 
conclude that a minimum effective taxation approach would be preferable to a DBRMPA.   
 
Part I.  Background 
 
IA.  The Decline of the Arm’s Length Standard 
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is intended to ensure that multinational 
corporations (“MNCs”) do not obtain inappropriate tax advantages by pricing transactions 
                                                 
5  The term “super-normal return” has an understood meaning in economic theory.  The term “excess return” 
does not.  I view the returns for which taxing rights may be reallocated in a DBRMPA to be related to but 
not always the same as the “super-normal return” concept in economics, and so I use the term “excess returns” 
going forward in this paper.   
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within the group differently than independent enterprises would do at “arm’s length.”  
More than half of world trade is now intra-firm.6  Thus, more than half of world trade is 
subject to transfer pricing. 
 
Under the arm’s length principle, multinational groups are supposed to divide their income 
for tax purposes among affiliates in the different countries in which the MNC does 
business, in a way that is meant to emulate the results that would transpire if the 
transactions had occurred between independent enterprises.7  For most of the last forty 
years, the arm’s length principle represented a consensual solution reached among 
technicians for the problem of allocating tax between different parts of an MNC. 8  
Although the mantra of “arm’s length” masked real disagreement, and members of the 
transfer pricing practitioner community often held the view that there was substantial 
controversy as to the proper implementation of the arm’s length standard, the range of 
interpretation was, in practice, reasonably narrow.  Major transfer-pricing disputes arose 
with regularity, but they were addressed within a framework that largely respected 
intercompany contracts and the concept of allocation of risk within a multinational group.9 
 
In the last decade, however, the “arm’s length standard” became extraordinarily 
controversial.10  Transfer pricing even became the subject of contentious discussion among 
                                                 
6 “More than half of U.S. imports from its main non-NAFTA trading partners (with the exception of China 
and Italy) are also intra-firm transactions.  In contrast, U.S. exports to its main non-NAFTA trading partners 
are predominantly arm’s-length – 53-65 percent of U.S. exports to large European Union and Asian countries 
(France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, and United Kingdom…) fit this description.”  World Bank, 
Arm’s-Length Trade: A Source of Post-Crisis Trade Weakness, Global Economic Prospects Special Focus 2 
(June 2017), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/222281493655511173/Global-Economic-Prospects-June-
2017-Topical-Issue-Arms-length-trade.pdf. 
7 See, e.g., OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes 
with Value Creation, Actions 8-10-2015, at 9 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264241244-en 
[https://perma.cc/25E8-UCKY] [hereinafter “BEPS ACTIONS 8–10”].  The arm’s length principle requires 
that transactions between associated enterprises be priced as if the enterprises were independent, such that 
the pricing reflects what third parties operating at arm’s length would agree upon with one another. 
8 John Neighbour, Transfer pricing, Keeping it at arm’s length, OECD Observer, Apr. 21, 2002, at 29, 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_length
.html.  Of course, important academic critiques and alternative proposals existed before the onset of the BEPS 
project.  See generally, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Splitting the Unsplittable: Toward a Formulary Approach to 
Allocating Residuals Under Profit Split, Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 378 (2013) (proposing that the OECD use formulary apportionment to allocate residual profit of 
the “profit split method”).   
9 See Matthias Schroger, Transfer Pricing:  Next Steps in the International Debate, Tax Policy Challenges in 
the 21st Century 310-12 (Karoline Spies & Raffaele Petruzzi eds., 2014).  Whether one views that outcome 
as good policy or not, the relatively clear intellectual boundaries for these disputes were an outgrowth of the 
fact that discussion of transfer pricing was limited to tax administrators and other specialists. 
10  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines:  A 
Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 World Tax J. 3, 3 (2010) (arguing that while debate quieted with regard to the 
arm’s length standard after the adoption of the 1995 regulations and OECD guidelines, the arm’s length 
standard is unworkable and should be replaced by formulary apportionment); David Spencer, Senior Adviser, 
Tax Justice Network, Statement by the Tax Justice Network (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:07 AM), 
http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2012/03/tjn-statement-on-transfer-pricing.html (asserting that the “OECD’s 
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high-level elected officials with no tax expertise at all.11  Moreover, the so-called “stateless 
income”12 narrative became commonly accepted by tax policymakers in almost every 
developed economy. 
 
As a result, preexisting norms developed by the community of transfer-pricing specialists 
came under heavy and perhaps deserving scrutiny.  Views around the level of deference to 
be given to intergroup contractual arrangements in transfer pricing analyses diverged 
substantially, the consensus on the scope for recharacterizing intergroup transactions 
frayed, the consensus on respecting intergroup equity contributions declined.  Disputes 
among government officials about whether value creation in cross-border transactions 
undertaken by multinationals should be attributed to capital, labor, the market, user 
participation, or government support are now aired routinely.13 
 
Enormous political pressures coming from the highest levels of government and the G-20 
meant that some sort of outcome on transfer pricing was politically necessary as part of the 
BEPS project.14  Thus, in 2015, the BEPS project in effect endorsed the commonly held 
idea that the then-existing OECD transfer pricing guidelines were broken.  However, at the 
technical level bureaucrats failed to reach meaningful consensus on a clearly delineated 
alternative.  The result was a reliance on high levels of constructive ambiguity buried in 
many pages of technocratic language in the transfer-pricing outputs of the BEPS project.15 
 
One phrase that captures this ambiguity is the commitment to “align income taxation with 
                                                 
theory of the arm’s length principle no longer applies to multinational enterprises which are highly 
integrated”).  
11 See generally Stephen Timms, Fin. Sec’y to Treasury UK, Address at the OECD Tax & Development 
Conference (Jan. 27, 2010); G-20, Cannes Summit Final Declaration – Building our Common Future:  
Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All (Draft of November 4) (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html; see also Arun Jaitley, Hon. Fin. 
Minister, India, A Tax Vision for India, Peterson Institute for International Economics (Apr. 16, 2015).   
12 Ed Kleinbard deserves credit for naming the phenomenon and writing the most well-read article about how 
US MNC international tax planning in the pre-BEPS era worked.  See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, 
Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011).  However, his US outbound centric view created real 
difficulties for the United States as a matter of international tax diplomacy.  US tax reform is highlighting 
the extent to which foreign multinationals, especially those headquartered in Europe, have been achieving 
stateless income with respect to revenues earned in the United States for many years.  Unfortunately, no 
European academic has emerged who is willing to publicize and generalize about aggressive tax planning by 
European MNCs in the manner Ed did for US-headquartered MNCs.   
13 See generally Mindy Herzfeld, Input Needed on Transfer Pricing Drafts, 77 Tax Notes Int’l 392 (Feb. 2, 
2015); China International Tax Center / IFA China Branch, Comments on Discussion Draft on the Use of 
Profit Splits in the Context of Global Value Chains and other Related Transfer Pricing Issues (Feb. 6, 2015).  
US officials, for example, have bemoaned this phenomenon in multiple public appearances.   
14 See, e.g., comments Marlies de Ruiter, Interview:  OECD’s de Ruiter says Forthcoming Changes to 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines Achieve Correct Balance, 24 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. 775 (Oct. 15, 
2015) [hereinafter “de Ruiter Interview Comments”].  
15   See generally BEPS ACTIONS 8–10, supra note 7; see also Michael L. Schler, The Arm’s-Length 
Standard After Altera and BEPS, 149 Tax Notes 1149 (Nov. 30, 2015) (discussing ambiguities in the revised 
transfer pricing guidelines associated with attributing income to various forms of activity, control of risk, or 
something else). 
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value creation.”  Everyone agrees on the principle – but no one agrees what it means.16  
 
Nevertheless, if there was one central theme to the BEPS transfer pricing guidance taken 
as a whole, it was to put great weight for purposes of allocating intangible income and 
income associated with the contractual allocation of risk on “people functions.” The people 
functions of interest were activities by people who are of sufficiently high skill to engage 
in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles 
(the so-called “DEMPE functions”) as well as to be able to control financial risks, including 
those associated with the employment of intangibles.  It is these people functions that the 
post-BEPS transfer pricing guidelines treat as “meriting” the allocation of excess returns 
from intangibles.  In contrast, contractual or legal ownership of an intangible is not 
particularly significant, nor is “routine” labor.17  I call this approach to transfer pricing the 
“bourgeois labor theory of value” (“BLTV”).   
 
The labor theory of value asserts that the value of a good or service is fully dependent upon 
the labor used in its production.  This theory was an important lynchpin in the philosophical 
ideas of Karl Marx.  In contrast, conventional capitalist economic theory relies on a theory 
of marginalism, in which the value of any good or service is thought to be determined by 
its marginal utility.  Moreover, the pricing of a good or service is based on a relationship 
between that marginal utility, and the marginal productivity of all the factors of production 
required to produce the relevant good or service.  In addition to labor, a key factor of 
production required to produce most goods and services is capital – including real and 
intangible assets purchased with capital.  
 
The BLTV attributes profits quite heavily to the labor of certain highly educated workers 
who occupy upper middle management roles – roles and backgrounds broadly similar to 
those who negotiate transfer pricing rules for governments.  The theoretical basis in 
economics for this BEPS transfer pricing settlement is unclear.  It turns the Marxian labor 
theory of value on its head while being inconsistent with the conventional economic view, 
too.  To my mind this feature makes it even less coherent than other possible bases for 
transfer pricing.   
 
In the 2013 to 2015 period, the BLTV clearly seemed like an attractive alternative theory 
to various government officials.  It addressed the “cash box” problem of multinational 
income being parked in zero tax places like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, while 
attributing income to what the relevant officials viewed as “meaningful” activity.   
 
                                                 
16 Public presentations offer an illustration of this disagreement:  the national delegates and OECD officials 
that participated in negotiations of the revised transfer pricing guidelines began providing conflicting 
interpretations of what those guidelines meant almost immediately after the OECD’s new transfer pricing 
guidelines were released.  Compare de Ruiter Interview Comments, supra note 14 with comments of Brian 
Jenn, quoted in Ryan Finley, Transfer Pricing Report Obscured by Terminology, 80 Tax Notes Int’l 229, 230 
(Oct. 19, 2015).  
17 See BEPS ACTIONS 8-10, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.42-6.46. 
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However, the post-BEPS BLTV version of the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines, if 
implemented in good faith by tax administrations around the world, would effectively 
provide that a multinational corporation can in various situations save hundreds of millions 
or even billions of dollars by moving twenty or a hundred key jobs to a low-tax jurisdiction 
from a high-tax jurisdiction.  And many of those jurisdictions – Switzerland, Ireland, and 
increasingly the UK – are attractive places to live, with talented, high-skill labor pools 
already in place.   
 
Requiring that DEMPE activities be conducted in tax-favorable jurisdictions in order to 
justify income allocations to those jurisdictions encourages DEMPE jobs to move to those 
jurisdictions.  This transfer pricing result – that income may be shifted by moving high-
skilled jobs – is deeply geopolitically unstable.  From the corporate perspective, there can 
be huge incentives to shift DEMPE jobs if enough tax liability rides on the decision.  At 
the same time, large developed economies with higher tax rates simply will not accept an 
arrangement that sees them losing both tax revenue and headquarters and R&D jobs.   
 
In providing the above critique regarding the BEPS transfer pricing settlement, I do not 
wish to be misunderstood.  Outside the transfer pricing area (BEPS Actions 8-10), I believe 
the BEPS project had many notable accomplishments.  Global best practices and minimum 
standards were developed with respect to important issues like hybridity, interest expense 
deductions, information reporting, and more.  The BEPS project certainly showed how soft 
law in the international tax space can be quite efficacious.  But transfer pricing is 
sufficiently important that the failure to reach a sensible result in this space casts a shadow 
over the BEPS project generally.  The failure to grapple in a sensible way with the questions 
raised by transfer pricing is one important reason the post-BEPS environment is 
characterized by much of the global tax chaos the BEPS project was supposed to prevent.18 
 
IB.  The Relationship Between the Arm’s Length Standard, Jurisdiction to Tax, and 
the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 
 
Tax treaties specify when an enterprise based in one state has a sufficient connection to 
another state to justify taxation by the latter state.  Under Article 5 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, a sufficient connection exists when an enterprise resident in one state (the 
“residence state”) has a “permanent establishment” in another state (the “source state”).  
The permanent establishment threshold must be met before the source state may tax that 
enterprise on active business income properly attributable to the enterprise’s activity in the 
source state.  The permanent establishment rule encapsulated in Article 5 thus represents 
the basic international standard governing jurisdiction to tax a non-resident enterprise.   
 
                                                 
18 Cf.  The Global Tax Environment in 2016 and Implications for International Tax Reform:  Hearing Before 
the H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means, 114th Cong. (2016) (Testimony of Itai Grinberg, Associate Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/20160224fc-Grinberg-Testimony.pdf. 
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Under Article 7 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention, profits attributable to a permanent 
establishment (“PE”) are those that the PE would have derived if it were a separate and 
independent enterprise performing the activities which cause it to be a PE.19  In 2010, the 
OECD issued a report on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments.  The report 
concluded that a PE should be treated as if it were distinct and separate from its overseas 
head office; and that assets and risks should be attributed to the PE or the head office in 
line with the location of “significant people functions.”   
 
The post-2010 OECD approach to attributing profits to a PE is commonly referred to as 
the Authorized OECD Approach (“AOA”).20  This approach is based on the adoption of 
the 2010 version of the business profits article (Article 7) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention.  Step one of the AOA leads to the recognition of internal dealings between the 
PE and its head office. 21  Then, under step two, the guidance in the OECD’s transfer 
pricing guidelines (“TPG”) is applied by analogy to determine the arm’s length pricing of 
the internal dealing between the PE and the head office.22  The 2010 report on the AOA 
made clear that as the TPG were modified in the future, the AOA should be applied “by 
taking into account the guidance in the Guidelines as so modified from time to time.”23 
 
In the BEPS project, many countries focused on the idea that technological progress 
(especially the internet) and the globalization of business have made it easier to be heavily 
involved in the economic life of another jurisdiction without meeting the historic 
permanent establishment threshold.  In the end the BEPS project produced some notable 
changes to the permanent establishment threshold.24  These changes to Article 5 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention are now being transposed into the global tax treaty network 
via the multilateral instrument, which itself represents another success of the BEPS project.  
Importantly, however, the BEPS project concluded that the AOA did not need to be 
revisited in light of the changes to Article 5.  
 
Fundamentally, the AOA was developed because if associated enterprises in different 
countries were taxed under the arm’s length standard under Article 9, but PEs were taxed 
                                                 
19  OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, art. 7 (2007), 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/mtc_cond-2017-en [hereinafter “OECD Model Treaty”]. 
20  Not all countries adopted the AOA; as such the attribution of profits to PEs and various countries’ 
interpretations and practices with respect to Article 7 have continued to vary considerably. 
21 See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD Model Treaty (para 16 et seq). 
22 The OECD agrees that this basic principle applies regardless of whether a tax administration has adopted 
the AOA as explicated in the 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments.  See 
OECD, Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, BEPS Action 7, at 7 
(2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/additional-guidance-attribution-of-profits-to-permanent-
establishments-BEPS-action-7.pdf [hereinafter “OECD Additional Guidance”]. 
23 OECD, 2010 Report on The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, ¶ 10 (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/45689524.pdf. 
24 These changes primarily involved ensuring that commissionaire arrangements could not be used to avoid 
a PE and modifications to the rules on specific activity exemptions.  The latter change was viewed by the 
OECD as being “particularly relevant in the case of digitalised businesses.”  See, e.g., OECD Additional 
Guidance, supra note 22, at 7.   
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under some other rule under Article 7, distortions between structures involving PEs and 
structures involving subsidiaries would arise.  As a result, the OECD Model Tax 
Convention attempts to apply the TPG and the arm’s length principle as consistently as 
possible in both cases.25    
 
Applying the AOA means that the PE and its head office are treated like independent 
enterprises.  Note, however, that modern tax treaty permanent establishment tests are built 
to a significant degree on an underlying idea of dependence that differs from 
dependence/independence of ownership. 26   Thus, the AOA taxes a permanent 
establishment as if the PE and its head office are independent enterprises, but by definition 
a dependent agent PE requires dependence.  This paradox is a product of the decision to 
have the transfer pricing rules trump the permanent establishment rules and make the arm’s 
length standard the central organizing principle. 27   As a result, in our current legal 
construct, discussing the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment requires 
discussing which rules we wish to use to allocate MNE profits generally. 
 
The alternative to the dependency criteria for establishing the existence of a PE is physical 
presence.  Arguably, that mechanism for establishing a PE is just a proxy for meaningful 
presence in the economic life of a jurisdiction through dependent agents.  Historically the 
physical presence rule was also a pragmatic administrative consideration.  The physical 
presence of either an enterprise or a dependent agent of the enterprise was necessary in 
order to collect tax revenues from a taxpayer.  Today, however, the pragmatic consideration 
is much less important in business-to-business transactions, given the development of 
reverse-charging type mechanisms and the ability to require a resident business to withhold 
from a non-resident.  Moreover, in the internet era, it seems to me a losing argument to 
suggest that large digital firms do not have a meaningful global presence.  So the principled 
debate with respect to jurisdiction to tax and attribution of profits to permanent 
establishments is just the debate about how to allocate the profits of an MNE among 
jurisdictions generally.28 
 
IC.  The Rise of International Tax Unilateralism and the Push to Tax Big Tech 
 
                                                 
25 See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD Model Treaty, para 16 (“the basic approach incorporated 
in the paragraph for the purposes of determining what are the profits that are attributable to the permanent 
establishment is therefore to require the determination of the profits under the fiction that the permanent 
establishment is a separate enterprise and that such an enterprise is independent from the rest of the enterprise 
of which it is a part as well as from any other person… that faction corresponds to the arm’s length principle 
which is also applicable, under the provisions of Article 9, for purposes of adjusting the profits of associated 
enterprises.”) 
26 The PE concept of dependence has been with us since the PE test was first developed in the League of 
Nations, before the adoption of the arm’s length standard.   See generally Richard J. Vann, Tax Treaties:  The 
Secret Agent’s Secrets, 3 BTR 345 (2006). 
27 Id. 
28 I acknowledge that there are enforcement challenges associated with requiring smaller businesses without 
physical presence to pay tax in a jurisdiction, but I do not view that as a first-order issue. 
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Many jurisdictions decided quite quickly that they were not satisfied with the BEPS 
transfer pricing outcomes, at least with respect to specific companies or sectors where they 
wished to collect more revenue.  The marquee actor in this story is the United Kingdom.  
 
In 2015, before the BEPS project had ended, the United Kingdom imposed a 25% tax on 
profits deemed to be artificially diverted away from the UK.  The Diverted Profit Tax 
(“DPT”) targets instances where, under existing permanent establishment rules, an MNC 
legitimately avoids a UK taxable presence, despite the fact that the MNC is supplying 
goods or services to UK customers.  The UK took the position that the DPT was not covered 
by the United Kingdom’s income tax treaties, and therefore that the permanent 
establishment rules tax treaties specify as to when a state has jurisdiction to tax an 
enterprise based in another state did not apply to the DPT.   
 
The primary justification for OECD countries recommending and the G-20 launching the 
BEPS project had been to develop rules-based multilateral reforms that would prevent 
unilateral actions by the countries participating in the BEPS project.  The UK adopted the 
DPT at the same time that it was helping lead the BEPS project.  The UK’s decision both 
to lead a multilateral project that was supposed to set internationally agreed rules that 
would prevent inconsistent unilateral action, and at the same time unilaterally adopt the 
DPT, a tax that was not consistent with BEPS, was broadly perceived as a significant blow 
to tax multilateralism.  The decision treated sovereignty as a license for organized 
hypocrisy.  But for the DPT, one could imagine that a more cooperative international tax 
environment might have evolved out of the BEPS project.29   
 
Under the DPT, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) can choose which 
companies it wishes to pursue and to what degree.30  Thus, the DPT also struck a blow 
against non-discrimination principles in international taxation.  Indeed, in press interviews 
UK government officials referred to the DPT simply as the “Google Tax.”31  The extent to 
which the DPT is an arbitrary levy on targets of interest to HMRC is well-illustrated by the 
twelve-fold increase in revenues raised by the DPT between 2015/2016 and 2017/2018.32  
                                                 
29 Note also the inclusion of a digital services tax (DST) in the UK budget of October 29, 2018.  The DST 
represents another instance of UK unilateralism in the midst of a multilateral project in which it claims to 
be a fully committed participant.  HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax (Oct 29. 
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2172/DST_web.pdf 
30 Dan Neidle et al., The UK Diverted Profits Tax:  Final Legislation Published, Clifford Chance, Mar. 25, 
2015, http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/03/the_uk_diverted_profitstaxfinallegislatio.html. 
31 It is still known by that moniker. Vanessa Houlder, ‘Google tax’ take swells to £281m as levy starts to bite, 
Financial Times, Sept. 13, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/4f7aed86-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b. 
32 See generally HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC], Transfer Pricing and Diverted Profits Tax statistics, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/729876/T
ransfer_Pricing_and_Diverted_Profits_Tax_statistics.pdf (estimating an increase in the “DPT Yield” from 
£31m in 2015/16 to £388m in 2017/18).  DPT charging notices raised 57% of the revenue HMRC attributed 
to the DPT in 2017/2018.  The remainder was raised by what HMRC referred to as “behavioral change,” the 
central element of which was “additional Corporation Tax paid as a result of HMRC intervention to ensure 
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Twelve-fold increases in revenue without a change in the rate or rules simply do not happen 
when tax law functions in the normal way.33   
 
Following the UK’s lead, by late 2017, countries as diverse as Australia, Argentina, Chile, 
France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, and Uruguay had 
taken unilateral actions not limited by or consistent with the BEPS agreements.  These 
measures are generally designed to increase levels of inbound corporate income taxation.  
Many are structured so that, as a practical matter, they primarily affect US MNCs.  Among 
other examples, in 2016 Australia enacted a DPT-like measure with a 40% tax rate (also 
publicly known as the “Google Tax”).  India imposed a 6% “equalization levy” on 
outbound payments to nonresident companies for digital advertising services.  India’s 
legislation authorized extending the tax to all digital services by administrative action.  The 
Israel Tax Authority announced an interpretation of Israeli law that significantly reduces 
the level of physical presence necessary for direct taxation of nonresident digital 
companies.  The Korean government is considering amendments to the Korean Corporate 
Tax Act to override Korean tax treaties and treat “global information and communications 
technology companies” as having a digital Korean PE.  Uruguay has enacted, and 
Argentina is considering, measures similar to those adopted in India.  During this same 
time period the Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Comp”) at the European 
Commission reconceptualized its “state aid” concept in the international tax context, 
notably by claiming that DG Comp was not limited by the OECD’s arm’s length standard 
in determining whether tax rulings were consistent with EU law.34 
 
                                                 
that profits earned in the UK are taxed in the UK.”  That is to say, HMRC threatened to charge DPT and 
instead a company ‘voluntarily’ opted to pay more UK corporation tax.   
33 Officials from the OECD and the IMF, as well as the canonical Vogel treatise, generally define taxes as 
legally compulsory and unrequited payments to a government that do not provide a specific economic benefit.  
Moreover, to qualify as a tax under these definitions, the required payment must be a result of law of general 
applicability that is reasonably clear in its application.  See, e.g., Werner Haslehner et al., Klaus Vogel on 
Double Taxation Conventions Art. 2 at 26 (Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust eds., 4th ed. 2015); Ken 
Messere et al., Tax Policy:  Theory and Practice in OECD Countries 240 (2003); Ruud De Mooij & Michael 
Keen, Taxing Principles:  Making the best of a necessary evil, Finance & Development, Dec. 2014, Vol. 51, 
No. 4.  So, to ask a provocative question – does the DPT meet that test?  Note that after France enacted a 
DPT-like tax, the French constitutional council struck the tax down on the basis that it gave the tax authority 
too much discretion to selectively target individual taxpayers, and therefore was not constitutional under 
French law.  See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2016-744 DC, Dec. 29, 
2016 (Fr.), https://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/decisions/2016744dc/2016744dc.pdf; see also Davide 
Anghileri, France’s diverted profits tax ruled unconstitutional, MNE Tax (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://mnetax.com/frances-diverted-profit-tax-ruled-unconstitutional-18873. 
34 In the Belgian state aid case, the Commission wrote that, “for any avoidance of doubt, the arm’s length 
principle that the Commission applies in its state aid assessment is not that derived from Article 9 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD TP Guidelines, which are nonbinding instruments, but a 
general principle of equal treatment in taxation falling within the application of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, 
which binds the Member States and from whose scope the national tax rules are not excluded.”  Commission 
Decision of 11.1.2016 on the Excess Profit Exemption State Aid Scheme SA.37667 Implemented by 
Belgium, C(2015) 9837 final, para 150, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/256735/256735_1748545_185_2.pdf.   
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More recently, governments around the world have been proposing or enacting taxes 
targeted specifically at digital advertising and online platforms.  India went first with its 
previously-mentioned tax on digital advertising.  Then, in September 2017, the European 
Commission called for new international rules that would alter the application of 
permanent establishment and transfer pricing rules for the digital economy alone. 35  
Moreover, the Commission argued that until such time as a digital-specific reform of the 
international tax system was agreed upon, an interim tax based on turnover, or a 
withholding mechanism, should be imposed on digital platform companies.36  The UK 
followed up on the Commission’s digital tax proposals with its own position paper on 
corporation tax and the digital economy.37  On October 29, 2018, the UK announced the 
introduction of a “digital services tax” that is based on turnover and is explicitly ring-
fenced to hit only large search engine, social media, and online marketplace businesses.38  
Other unilateral measures focusing on the digital economy have been taken by India 
(significant economic presence PE),39 Israel (digital PE), and others.  Like the earlier round 
of unilateral measures, some of these proposals have been described both in government 
documents and in the media as taxes targeting “GAFA:”  Google, Apple, Facebook, and 
Amazon.  However, the proposals generally are structured to have an impact beyond those 
four corporations.   
 
Separately, in 2017 Germany adopted its “Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard 
to Licensing of Rights.”  New section 4j of the German Income Tax Act restricts deductions 
for royalties and similar payments made to related parties if such payments are subject to 
a non-OECD compliant preferential tax regime and are taxed at an effective rate below 
25%.40  The provision also includes a conduit rule along the same general lines as US code 
provision section 7701(l).41    
 
                                                 
35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:  A Fair and Efficient 
Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, at 9, COM (2017) 547 final (Sept. 21, 
2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/communication_taxation_digital_single_market_e
n.pdf. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 That position paper was released after tax reform was introduced in the US House and US Senate, but 
before the 2017 Act passed.   
38 See HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax (Oct 29. 
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2172/DST_web.pdf 
39  See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, India Budget 2018:  Aiming for the Bullseye 28 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/budget/2018/aiming_for_the_bullseye_pwc_union_budget_2018_booklet.p
df. 
40  See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [German Income Tax Act], § 4j; see also, e.g., EY, German 
Parliament adopts legislation on limitation of tax deduction of royalties and tax exemption of restructuring 
gains (May 2, 2017). 
41 Id.  (“If (i) the recipient of the payments or (ii) another party related to the German payer incurs expenses 
for license rights from which the rights derive that are licensed to the German payer, and the recipient of 
those payments benefits from an unqualified IP regime, then the deduction of the German licensee’s 
payments are denied to the extent the ultimate payment recipient faces an effective rate below 25%.”)   
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In 2017 the UK also opened consultations on a royalty withholding tax proposal, which is 
now scheduled to be enacted and in force from 6 April 2019.42  This withholding tax would 
generally apply where a non-UK entity making sales in the UK does not have a taxable 
presence in the UK.  Withholding is also extended to payments for the right to distribute 
goods or perform specified services in the UK.  Since there is no UK entity making a 
payment, the proposal applies almost exclusively to cases where a non-UK company 
selling to UK customers pays a royalty to a 3rd country jurisdiction.  HMT describes the 
proposal as a step to tax the digital economy, but acknowledges that it has application 
beyond the digital sector.  For example imagine a Brazilian MNC has a subsidiary in 
Ireland making sales in the UK and paying a royalty to an entity in the Cayman Islands.  
Under these proposals, the UK would be trying to withhold from the royalty paid from 
Ireland to the Cayman Islands.  The proposal thus raises the enforcement issues raised in 
the canonical SDI Netherlands case. 
 
Realistically, more unilateral measures to increase source country taxation, market country 
taxation, or both are coming.  These changes are likely to be somewhat uncoordinated, and 
sometimes unprincipled.  Moreover, these moves toward source or market country taxation 
are likely to affect “old-line” businesses as well as the digital sector.  Tax directors of 
multinationals in a wide range of industries already highlight that the label “BEPS” is used 
to justify a wide range of source-country tax adjustments that produce significant tax 
controversies. 
 
Historically the multilateral international tax architecture was focused on residence country 
taxation.  The international tax architecture around the world appears to be shifting towards 
more source-based or destination-based taxation, but that transition is turning out to be 
very messy.  The strategic questions for the United States created by this unsettled state of 
international tax affairs featured prominently in the final round of discussions about US 
international tax reform. 43   
 
ID.  US Tax Reform, the BEAT and the GILTI 
 
By the time of the 2016 elections, there was widespread consensus that the United States 
needed to reform its aberrant international corporate tax system.  Commentators called for 
a lower corporate tax rate, and a move away from a deferral system and towards the 
dividend exemption systems that had become an international norm.  Other countries had 
been taking these steps for years, while also increasing their reliance on consumption taxes 
and decreasing their reliance on corporate income taxes.   
 
                                                 
42 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/offshore-receipts-from-intangible-property/income-tax-
offshore-receipts-in-respect-of-intangible-property 
43 International Tax Reform:  Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Itai 
Grinberg, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Grinberg%20October%202017%20SFC%20International%
20Tax%20Testimony%20FINAL.PDF [hereinafter “Grinberg Senate Testimony”]. 
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Nevertheless, at the outset of 2017, few commentators thought the US political system 
would successfully bring a tax reform package to fruition.  Then, as we all know, the United 
States surprised the world by enacting tax reform.  The international corporate component 
of the reform was labeled as a shift to a “territorial” regime.  However, the law enacted 
actually moved the United States closer to a current worldwide tax system for outbound 
taxation, instantiated in a regime now known as the “GILTI.”  At the same time, the US 
followed the global trend in enacting unilateral measures intended to strengthen inbound 
taxation.  The United States’ did so by adopting the “base erosion anti-abuse tax” in new 
section 59A of the Code (“BEAT”). 
 
The GILTI is the main subject of Dana Trier’s conference paper and the panel immediately 
preceding the presentation of this paper at the conference.  Therefore I will not go to any 
great lengths to describe the GILTI here.  Practitioners have also written about the various 
twists and turns of the BEAT, and I do not propose to reconstruct the full breadth of that 
discussion, either.  Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness a brief background on these 
provisions is appropriate.   
 
ID.1.  GILTI 
 
Section 951A requires each US shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) to 
include currently in its gross income its share of global intangible low-taxed income 
(“GILTI”) for the year.  In very general terms, GILTl refers to a US shareholder’s share of 
a CFC’s income above a 10 percent return on qualified business asset investment (“QBAI”) 
with respect to everything other than five enumerated categories of CFC income.  Those 
categories are effectively connected income, subpart F income, income that would be 
subpart F income but for the section 954(b)(4) high-tax kickout, certain intercompany 
dividends, and foreign oil and gas extraction income.  A US shareholder of a CFC includes 
in income its GILTI in a manner similar to the inclusion mechanism for subpart F income.  
GILTI is eligible for a fifty percent deduction under section 250 (through 2025).  Therefore, 
a minimum effective US tax rate of 10.5 percent applies to all GILTI earnings of CFCs of 
US shareholders.  Special rules apply regarding foreign taxes associated with GILTI.  Very 
generally, if a US shareholder that is a domestic corporation elects to take foreign tax 
credits for a taxable year, all of the foreign taxes associated with GILTI are included in its 
income as a deemed dividend under section 78.  However, only 80 percent of these foreign 
taxes are allowed as deemed paid foreign tax credits in the new GILTI foreign tax credit 
basket.44   
 
The New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”) observes that the GILTI can be 
understood conceptually as a hybrid between “a flat minimum domestic and foreign tax 
rate on a US shareholder’s GILTI inclusions not associated with QBAI (the ‘flat rate 
theory’) and the imperfect adding of the GILTI regime onto the subpart F regime (the ‘add-
                                                 
44 26 USC. § 960(d)(1). 
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on theory’).”45  One’s understanding of which theory should dominate can influence many 
regulatory decisions.  But no matter how one thinks about the regime enacted in the statute 
(or how the regulations are written), the regime will generally produce at least a minimum 
10.5% combined domestic and foreign tax on a US shareholder’s GILTI not attributable to 
QBAI.46  Moreover, given that the concerns in international tax policy are overwhelmingly 
intangible income-driven, and that the digital sector is “tangible asset light,” ignoring 
QBAI constitutes a reasonable first-order simplification for purposes of this paper. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that most of the complexity entailed by the international tax 
regulations now being issued by the United States Treasury in this area are the product of 
the QBAI concept, the foreign tax credit basketing system enacted for GILTI, and the 
legislative design decision to layer a shareholder level calculation on top of entity-level 
concepts.  None of these features is inherent in or essential to enacting a flat rate minimum 
tax policy.47    
 
ID.2.  The Relationship between GILTI and the Digital Tax Debate 
 
The consequences of GILTI for the international tax debate in the “digital” space should 
have been profound.  When the BEPS project began, the digital economy was a special 
area of focus because it was considered an important case of so-called “stateless income.”48 
 
Following the 2017 legislation, the minimum tax rates on foreign earnings achievable for 
US-headquartered firms have changed.  Speaking generally, an intangible driven US-
parented multinational simply will not be able to achieve an effective tax rate on their 
foreign earnings that is below 10.5%.  An effective rate of 10.5% for corporate shareholders 
                                                 
45 New York State Bar Ass’n [NYSBA] Tax Section, Report No. 1394 on the GILTI Provisions of the Code 
15 (May 4, 2018), 
http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2018/1394_Report.html. 
46 Given the FTC limitations imposed because of the GILTI FTC basket, in many situations the combined 
US and foreign tax rate on CFC income will be well in excess of 13.125%.  
47 Indeed, neither Camp “Option C,” as eventually proposed in HR 1 2014 when Representative Camp 
(Republican from Michigan) was chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, nor the “Option Y” 
and “Option Z” proposals released by Senator Baucus (Democrat from Montana) in 2013 when he was Chair 
of the Senate Finance Committee included a QBAI concept.  Options Y and Z also used a partial 
exemption/partial full inclusion and foreign tax credit and expense disallowance mechanisms that may 
represent a more sensible and elegant way to address limitations on foreign tax credits and related expense 
allocation issues in a minimum tax regime than the mechanism ultimately adopted by the United States in 
2017.   
48 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, BEPS Action 1:  2014 Deliverable, 112 
(Sept. 16, 2014) (“The comprehensiveness of the BEPS Action Plan will ensure that, once the different 
measures are implemented in a co-ordinated manner, taxation is more aligned with where economic activities 
take place… with the aim to put an end to the phenomenon of so-called stateless income.”).  In fact large US 
firms based in Silicon Valley were achieving very low rates of tax on their foreign earnings under the old US 
international tax regime.  See European Commission, Report of the Commission Expert Group on Taxation 
of the Digital Economy (May 28, 2014).  Consequently, European sovereigns took the position that special 
measures might be needed to solve this problem, unless the US acted and imposed tax on the relevant firms.  
At the same time, all the large developed economies said they had no interest in shifting the balance between 
source and residence. France, Germany and the United Kingdom were particularly strong on this point. 
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(after taking into account the 50% deduction described above) is comparatively 
unfavorable to the CFC regimes of most of the major trading partners of the United States, 
which typically tax CFC earnings in relatively limited circumstances.  As a practical matter 
the consequence is that BEPS leading to stateless income – the original driver for the entire 
international tax reform debate – is now a phenomenon that exists only for non-US 
headquartered multinationals. 
 
Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, the four companies specifically targeted in documents 
issued at various points by the Commission, the French government, and the German 
coalition agreement, each face a 10.5% minimum tax on their foreign earnings.  Since every 
EU member state has a dividend exemption system that does not include a minimum tax, 
and instead provides a 0% tax rate on foreign earnings when repatriated, companies like 
Volkswagen, Allianz, Daimler, Siemens in Germany, or BNP Paribas and Carrefour in 
France do not face a minimum tax burden on their foreign earnings.  They can, and in some 
circumstances still do, generate stateless income and achieve 0% tax on their foreign 
earnings.  That is the reality of current US corporate tax law as compared with the current 
corporate tax law of the largest continuing members of the EU.  Meanwhile, the UK’s 
corporate tax reforms beginning in 2012 were explicitly designed to ensure the ability of 
UK-headquartered multinationals to achieve a zero rate of tax on foreign earnings by 
generally exempting those earnings from UK tax.  
 
Therefore, when the Commission or HMT now propose a solution for the digital sector, 
that proposal is not about addressing low taxed income or leveling an unlevel playing field 
– the justifications given for rule changes in BEPS just a few years ago.  Rather, the 
proposals are now clearly about a revenue shift to move tax revenue from jurisdictions of 
residence to the jurisdictions where digital companies have users.49 
 
ID.3.  BEAT 
 
The BEAT was enacted to address legislative concerns that the former US international tax 
regime made foreign ownership of almost any asset or business more attractive than US 
ownership from a tax perspective, thereby creating tax-driven incentives for foreign 
takeovers of US firms and foreign acquisition of business units previously owned by US 
MNCs and financial pressures that encourage US MNCs to “invert” (move their 
headquarters abroad), produce abroad for the US market, and shift business income to low-
tax jurisdictions abroad.  Until recently, little policy attention was given to reining in the 
benefits that US law gives to inbound multinationals that make foreign status more 
attractive than domestic status.  In this regard the US was a global outlier:  in the rest of 
the world, governments have been focusing their policy efforts almost exclusively on 
inbound taxpayers that minimize their income in local jurisdictions since the onset of the 
                                                 
49 For a balanced perspective on the broader question, see Wolfgang Schön, Ten Questions about Why and 
How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5, at 79-81 (2018). 
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financial crisis.  With the BEAT, the US took a bold but highly imperfect step to join the 
global consensus that inbound must be addressed. 
 
New section 59A of the Code imposes an additional tax equal to the “base erosion 
minimum tax amount” (the “BEAT tax”) of “applicable taxpayers.”50  The BEAT tax 
generally means “the excess (if any) of an amount equal to 10 percent… of the modified 
taxable income of such taxpayer for the taxable year, over an amount equal to the regular 
tax liability… of the taxpayer for the taxable year, reduced (but not below zero) by [certain 
credits].”51  In other words, the BEAT tax is calculated as the difference between the 
corporation’s regular tax liability and an alternative calculation based on the corporation’s 
modified taxable income.   
 
Modified taxable income for BEAT tax purposes is generally defined as taxable income 
computed without regard to any deduction with respect to a payment to a foreign related 
party.52  Certain exceptions (notably for certain payments for services) apply.  Payments 
for cost of goods sold (“COGS”) also have no effect on the calculation of modified taxable 
income because, as a technical matter, COGS are a reduction in gross receipts (rather than 
a deductible payment). 53  The characterization of payments, especially with respect to 
transactions involving bundled services and goods, can therefore affect whether a payment 
is within the scope of the BEAT provision.  The BEAT’s “modified taxable income” base 
is also determined without regard to the base erosion percentage of any net operating loss 
(“NOL”) allowed for the tax year.   
 
Only “applicable taxpayers” are subject to the BEAT at all.  To be an applicable taxpayer, 
a US corporation and its affiliates 54  must meet certain criteria. 55   Notably, the US 
corporation generally must have a “base erosion percentage” of 3 percent or higher.  This 
                                                 
50 26 USC. § 59A(a).  Section 59A is effective for “base erosion payments” paid or accrued in taxable years 
beginning after December 31, 2017. 
51 § 59A(b)(1).  Regular tax liability is defined in section 26(b).  The applicable credits are:  the excess of 
“the credits allowed under this chapter against such regular tax liability” over, the sum of those “allowed 
under section 38 for the taxable year which is properly allocable to the research credit determined under 
section 41(a)”; and “the portion of the applicable section 38 credits not in excess of 80 percent of the lesser 
of the amount of such credits.  I.R.C. § 59A(b)(1)(B).  Applicable section 38 credits are defined in section 
59A(b)(4). 
52 § 59A(d).  To be more precise, base erosion payments include any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer 
to a foreign person which is a related party of the taxpayer and with respect to which a deduction is allowable, 
any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party of the taxpayer in 
connection with the acquisition by the taxpayer from such person of property of a character subject to the 
allowance for depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation, reinsurance payments paid or accrued by 
the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party, and certain other payments to an expatriated entity 
which is a related party of the taxpayer which result in a reduction of the gross receipts of the taxpayer. 
53  An item included in COGS can qualify as a base erosion payment if it is paid to certain inverted 
corporations or members of an expanded affiliated group of an inverted corporation.  See § 59A(d)(4). 
54  § 59A(e)(3) treats those persons classified as a single employer under section 52(a), with some 
modification, as a single taxpayer for the purposes of calculating gross receipts and base erosion percentage. 
55 Regulated investment companies, real estate investment trusts, and S corporations are also exempt from 
the BEAT.   
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base erosion percentage is generally determined by dividing the aggregate amount of a 
taxpayer’s “base erosion tax benefits” for the taxable year, by the sum of the aggregate 
amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer, plus certain base erosion tax benefits 
allowable to the taxpayer.   
 
The BEAT has been the subject of cogent critiques by the NYSBA and other 
commentators.56  The key BEAT complications for purposes of this discussion relate to the 
treatment of foreign tax credits and the base erosion percentage concept.  In my view, these 
two features of the BEAT should be removed.   
 
Most tax credits are disregarded in determining regular tax liability for purposes of the 
BEAT calculation. 57  Most importantly, foreign tax credits are disregarded.  The treatment 
of foreign tax credits under the BEAT disfavors foreign taxes paid by BEAT taxpayers 
relative to any other business expense.  In other words, foreign taxes are in effect not even 
deductible for BEAT taxpayers.  In various circumstances, the rule disregarding the value 
of foreign tax credits for purposes of measuring hypothetical regular tax liability increases 
the BEAT minimum tax dollar for dollar.58  Foreign taxes paid by US MNCs are thus 
treated almost as if they were equivalent to bribes and payments made to entities in Iran 
and North Korea.  This treatment is not justifiable.  Moreover, disallowing foreign tax 
credits has no clear relationship to base erosion.    
 
Second, if a taxpayer’s “base erosion percentage” is 3% or less, they are not subject to the 
BEAT.  The base erosion percentage is generally determined by dividing the aggregate 
amount of “base erosion tax benefits” of the taxpayer for the taxable year, by the sum of 
the aggregate amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer plus certain other tax 
benefits allowable to the taxpayer.  Since both the numerator and denominator of the base 
erosion percentage fraction represent gross rather than net concepts, the rule is highly 
manipulable, and the cliff feature encourages manipulation.    
 
Importantly, the BEAT includes a broad grant of regulatory authority to the Treasury.  The 
provision includes specific authority to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or 
                                                 
56 See NYSBA Tax Section, Report No. 1397 on Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax 6 (July 16, 2018), 
http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2018/1397_Report.html.  The 
report politely explains a number of the ways in which the BEAT as enacted functions poorly.  Certain 
drafting errors associated with the current BEAT were deemed sufficiently problematic that the NYSBA felt 
compelled to write that “we believe that Treasury has authority to construe the provision logically in 
regulations to implement its legislative purpose, even in the absence of literal statutory support.” 
57 Disregarded credits include foreign tax credits, 20 percent of low-income housing credits (section 42(a)), 
20 percent of renewable energy production credits (section 45(a)), and 20 percent of section 46 investment 
credits allocable to the energy credit (section 48).  Research and Experimentation credits are not disregarded 
for purposes of establishing the hypothetical regular tax amount against which BEAT liability is in effect 
compared. 
58 For examples and a formula, see generally Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis:  The BEAT in a 
Diagram and an Easy-to-Use Spreadsheet, Tax Notes (June 26, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
reform/economic-analysis-beat-diagram-and-easy-use-spreadsheet. 
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appropriate.  The BEAT also includes a number of specific grants of regulatory authority.  
These include providing “for such adjustments to the application of this section as are 
necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section, including through” the 
use of unrelated persons, conduit transactions, other intermediaries, or transactions 
designed in whole or in part to characterize payments otherwise subject to the BEAT as 
not subject to the BEAT, or (quite extraordinarily) even regulations preventing taxpayers 
from obtaining benefits from substituting payments not subject to the BEAT as drafted 
with payments that would normally not be subject to the BEAT.59  The intent behind the 
scope of this remarkable grant of specific regulatory authority is not discussed in the 
legislative history.  Nevertheless, the language is sufficiently expansive as to raise the 
question of whether Congress intended the BEAT to give Treasury authority to reconsider 
allocation of profits generally for minimum tax purposes. 
 
Part II.  Value Creation and User Participation60 
 
Academic commentators of all ideological stripes have now explained in multiple articles 
that the international tax system is not now, and never has been, based on a value creation 
principle.61  Moreover, as I suggested in Part IA, no one entirely knows or agrees on the 
precise meaning of “value creation.”  Finally, the consensus academic view is that any 
exercise to define specific sources of value creation is entirely subjective.62  
 
Nevertheless, post-BEPS, various governments often repeat the mantra that “the 
international tax framework is based on a principle that the profits of a business should be 
taxed in the countries in which it creates value.”63  One proposal that features prominently 
among “value creationists” is known by the label “user participation.”  It purports to give 
appropriate credit to user participation in value creation in the digital economy.  This idea 
originated from HMT, was then taken up by the European Commission, and is now being 
studied by the OECD.  
                                                 
59 Section 59A(i). 
60 Part II of this paper draws heavily from a piece I recently published in the British Tax Review.  Itai 
Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation, British Tax Review (forthcoming 2018).   
61 See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate 
Tax Reform (Oxford Univ. Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper No. 17/07, 2017), 
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_
17/WP1707.pdf; Allison Christians, Taxing According to Value Creation, 90 Tax Notes Int’l 1379 (June 18, 
2018); Joanna Hey, “Taxation Where Value is Created” and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Initiative, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018). 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and The Digital Economy:  Position Paper Update, ¶ 1.1 (Mar. 
2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/c
orporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf [hereinafter “HMT Position Paper Update”].  A 
number of other reforms for the international tax system are also described by their advocates as reflecting 
the “value creation principle.”  One can best make sense of this development if one thinks of claiming the 
mantle of “value creation” as simply a claim that the reform being discussed should be the new multilateral 
norm. 
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HMT and the European Commission both maintain there is something distinctive about 
value creation in the digital economy.  They focus on the example of a user uploading data 
on a social media platform to illustrate the importance of user participation in the digital 
space.  The Commission argues that in this case user participation contributes to value 
creation because users’ “data will later be used and monetised for targeted advertising.  The 
profits are not necessarily taxed in the country of the user (and viewer of the advert), but 
rather in the country where the advertising algorithms has been developed, for example.  
This means that the user contribution to the profits is not taken into account when the 
company is taxed.”64   
 
HMT and the Commission also assert there is something special about online marketplaces 
and other “collaborative platforms,” that “generates revenue through matching suppliers 
and purchasers of a good”, or “charges a commission for bringing together supply and 
demand for assets and possessions owned by individuals. The success of those businesses 
is reliant on the active involvement of users on either side of the intermediated market and 
the expansion of that user base to allow the business to benefit from network effects, 
economies of scale and market power.”65  In contrast, HMT claims participation of users 
in non-digital businesses is generally “passive.” 
 
Two immediate questions arise with respect to the user participation theory put forth by 
HMT and the Commission.  The first question is whether there is any reason to believe that 
users only meaningfully contribute to value creation in the context of certain digital 
platforms.  The second is how, across the whole of the economy, one would determine 
when users contribute to value creation, and to what degree.   
 
If user participation is a meaningful concept, it cannot be rationally limited to information 
communication technologies.  Consider a clinical trial from a user participation 
perspective:  such trials involve a corporation giving thousands of individuals free 
medicine over a period of years in exchange for those users providing deeply personal 
medical data, as well as a service to the company – the use of their bodies for purposes of 
experimentation.  The resulting data is monetized by obtaining a patent and customizing 
products to specific diseases and patient populations.  This user data is also required for 
regulatory approvals, without which the company may not sell anything at all.  
 
The data provided by patients is deeply private biometric and health information.  In this 
sense, the data users provide in exchange for free products in the medical economy is often 
substantially more extensive and personal than the data that a digital user provides.  
Moreover, their engagement with the providers of their treatment is often more sustained 
                                                 
64 European Commission Memorandum MEMO/18/214, Questions and Answers on Fair and Efficient Tax 
System in the EU for the Digital Single Market (Mar. 21, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-18-2141_en.htm. 
65  See HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and The Digital Economy:  Position Paper, ¶ 3.18 (Nov. 2017), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661458/c
orporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_position_paper.pdf. 
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than a digital user of a social media platform.  After all, in some cases disengaging from 
the company (ceasing to supply data in exchange for treatment) might fundamentally 
impact a drug user’s health.  In sum, both active user participation and data contribution 
appear to be part of the medical economy. 
 
The most meaningful objection to the above analogy between user participation in the 
digital economy and user participation in the medical economy relates to the fact that the 
medical economy generally does not benefit from either “multisided business models” or 
network effects.  Indeed Commission, HMT, and OECD documents each often highlight 
these two economic phenomena in describing potential justifications for a special profit 
allocation for user participation in the digital economy. 66   
 
Neither multisided business models nor network effects are new economic phenomena, nor 
are those phenomena limited to the digital platform businesses affected by user 
participation proposals.  Multisided platform businesses are generally defined as 
businesses that a) offer distinct products or services, b) to different groups of customers, c) 
whom a “platform” connects, c) in simultaneous transactions.  In simpler terms, they are 
market makers – businesses that help unrelated parties get together to exchange value.  
Network effects refer to the phenomenon whereby a product or service gains additional 
value as more people use it.    
 
Before the advent of the internet, the classic example of a multisided business model with 
network effects used in economics discussions involved financial intermediation.  Credit 
card businesses represent one example.  On one side of the business consumers are offered 
convenience and financing, and on the other side merchants obtain a mechanism to receive 
payment other than in cash.  Moreover, the more merchants accept a credit card, the more 
attractive a credit card is to consumers, and the more consumers hold a credit card, the 
more willing merchants are to accept the card and its related interconnection fee.67  Other 
“non-digital” multi-sided business models with network effects include newspapers, 
traditional broadcast television, video game consoles, financial exchanges, and even 
farmer’s markets (which charge rent to sellers, and allow shoppers to enter the market for 
free).   
 
Of course a farmer’s market has network effects because it is more valuable to buyers and 
sellers respectively to the extent that there are more famers and more local shoppers 
participating.  However, the magnitude of the network effect is much greater, and 
                                                 
66 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:  A Fair and Efficient 
Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, supra note 35, at 9; OECD, Tax Challenges 
Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018 (2018), supra note 3, para 47, page 28. 
67 These businesses all exhibit what economists call “indirect network effects.” D. Evans & R. Schmalensee, 
Matchmakers:  The New Economics of Multisided Platforms 667 (2016).  Indirect network effects exist 
where the value of the two-sided platform to one group of participants depends on how many members of a 
different group participate.  Evans & Schmalensee 25.  Airbnb, Uber, and other businesses that intermediate 
transactions between groups of buyers of goods and services and groups of sellers of goods and services also 
share this feature that the value they provides increases as the number of participants on both sides of the 
platform increases. 
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potentially more salient for tax purposes, when the “platform” (the marketplace) involved 
can intermediate transactions globally.  That issue of magnitude is presumably what HMT 
and the European Commission think is special – network effects and multi-sided business 
models combined with so-called “cross-jurisdictional scale without mass.” 
 
Focusing on the issue of large network effects combined with cross-jurisdictional scale 
without mass brings us to financial exchanges.  Network effects are the key feature of 
successful financial market making, because for transactions to take place there must be 
both buyers and sellers.  Specifically, market liquidity is an important feature in 
determining transaction costs and making a market attractive to participants, and the 
number of participants is what determines liquidity.  As the number of buyers and sellers 
on a given exchange increase, liquidity increases, and costs fall.  Without enough buyers 
and sellers, the market literally falls apart.   
 
As an example, consider the Lloyd’s insurance marketplace, based in the UK.  The vast 
majority of Lloyd’s business involves insuring non-UK risks, often without any physical 
presence in the jurisdictions where the covered risk exists on behalf of either Lloyd’s or 
the underwriters and syndicates that form the Lloyd’s marketplace.68  Moreover, the vast 
majority of the capital in the Lloyd’s market does not come from the UK.69  But, as Lloyd’s 
itself explains, the certainty provided by the marketplace as well as the network effects 
from Lloyd’s global network of insurance companies, brokers, and coverholders “makes 
Lloyd’s the world’s leading (re)insurance platform.”70  The London stock exchange is 
another important financial marketplace, albeit one where at least some of the offerings are 
not as bespoke (and therefore require less data) than is customary at Lloyd’s.   
 
Do users somehow participate less “actively” in traditional financial marketplaces when 
they enter into transactions than they do in online sharing marketplaces?  The key 
participation feature of online marketplaces are reviews and ratings of sellers and buyers.   
Much more complex user data is shared among the specialist syndicates, brokers, and 
coverholders participating in the Lloyd’s insurance market than is shared by short term 
renters on a vacation rentals platform71.  And these market participants interact in more 
complicated ways than do renters and owners.  Moreover, Lloyd’s has now created a 
mandate that syndicates enter into many of their contracts electronically over a digital 
platform.72  So, using Lloyd’s as an example, it becomes difficult to see the clear distinction 
between an insurance intermediation platform and, for instance, the accommodation 
                                                 
68  See Lloyd’s, Annual Report, at 3 (2017), 
https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/investors/2017/2017_lbg_annual_report_v3.
pdf (approx. 85% of the risks insured by Lloyd’s are non-UK risks). 
69 See id.  (only 13% of the capital in the Lloyd’s market comes from the UK insurance industry). 
70  Lloyd’s, Lloyd’s in the US, 2 (2016), https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds-around-the-world/americas/us-
homepage/about-us. 
71 Or, as HMT puts it user participation in reviewing and rating “services provided by third parties is crucial 
in regulating what appears on the platform and establishing an important trust mechanism for other users.”  
HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63, ¶ 2.24. 
72  See Lloyd’s, Market Bulletin Y5170:  Electronic Placement Mandate (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.lloyds.com/market-resources/requirements-and-standards/electronic-placement. 
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intermediation platform represented by Airbnb.  It is true that historically one business 
(reinsurance) was globalized before the advent of the internet while the other (home 
rentals) was not.  And historically underwriters sometimes exchanged views offline, while 
renters often found it hard to exchange views at all.  However, now both businesses are 
globalized, users on both the buy side and the sell side share their views with one another 
in both industries, and one industry is fully digitalized while the other is working to move 
in that direction.  It seems intellectually unsustainable to claim there is a relevant difference 
with respect to user participation between the accommodation traded on Airbnb and 
bespoke products traded electronically in financial markets.  
 
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is likely to make the distinction between businesses with 
network effects and multisided business models and more ‘traditional” business even 
harder to maintain.  IoT refers to the network of physical objects embedded with sensors 
and network connectivity that allows the collection and exchange of data.  Such sensors 
are becoming ubiquitous in the devices we encounter in our daily environment.  A large 
number of IoT applications are being developed in various domains by start-ups, SMEs, 
and large MNCs alike.73   
 
One widely discussed IoT example is the idea of the “connected car.”  Connected cars are 
likely to feature seats that face a windshield that is akin to a computer screen.74  Trends in 
automotive research and development involve navigation and entertainment display 
screens built into the dashboard to offer internet-based information and media, as well as 
sensors intended to pick up information from roads and other networked cars.  On one 
model of what constitutes “active user participation,” a connected car would have all the 
components for user participation in place.  The user would provide geo proximity data by 
driving, financial information by leasing, and be in a car that acts as a channel to deliver 
advertising to a “captive” recipient.   
 
On another model, use of a connected car would not constitute “active user participation” 
because the user of a connected car would not be actively writing a message or rating a 
product or service.  In that case, however, clicks on a social media platform would also 
seem to constitute “passive” user participation.  It seems inconceivable that “going” to a 
website or “searching” virtually should be classified as active user participation but going 
somewhere physically should be classified as passive activity.  
 
Some projections suggest that there will be more than thirty billion IoT devices in use by 
2020.75  In addition to connected cars, commercial and industrial applications, driven 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Thibault Degrande, Frederic Vannieuwenborg, Sofie Verbrugge & Didier Colle, “Multi-sided 
Platforms for the Internet of Things,” 372-81 (2018). 
74 For high-level discussion, see, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017 Automotive Industry Trends:  The 
future depends on improving returns on capital (2017), https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/2017-
Automotive-Industry-Trends.pdf. 
75 Chin-Lung Hsu & Judy Chuan-Chuan Lin, An empirical examination of consumer adoption of Internet of 
Things services:  Network externalities and concern for information privacy perspectives, in 62 Computers 
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largely by building automation, industrial automation, and lighting, are projected to 
account for many of the new connected devices coming into use between 2018 and 2030.76  
If those projections come to pass, it is hard to imagine that user participation in historically 
non-digital sectors will not exceed any de minimis user participation threshold.   
 
In sum, it does not seem intellectually defensible to suggest that users only meaningfully 
contribute to value creation in the context of certain digital platforms, or to think that the 
boundaries of the idea are clear enough to allow for anything approaching reasonable 
implementation.  Indeed, as articulated thus far it is difficult to view the proposal as 
anything other than either a) ill-conceived or b) transparently instrumentalist and 
mercantilist.   
 
But understanding the user participation perspective remains important.  For one thing, the 
user participation proposal highlights the political angle much of Europe brings to the 
current digital tax debate.  Even more importantly, HMT and the Commission have both 
suggested that when “active user participation” is present, “jurisdictions in which users are 
located should be entitled to tax a portion of those businesses’ profits.”77  HMT wishes to 
achieve this result using what is in effect a formulary system.78  The Commission proposes 
doing so based on a facts and circumstances arm’s length analysis of the value of user 
participation.79  Either way, these proposals seek to allocate some (although not all) of the 
excess return of a business to the destination jurisdiction.  And that issue – destination-
based income taxation – lies at the heart of the intellectual debate about the future of the 
corporate income tax as applied cross-border.  
 
Indeed, the core of Part III is a discussion of a proposal for allocating excess returns through 
a reform of the international tax system that would create a hybrid between a destination-
based income tax and the present residence-based system.  Such a system would, like the 
user participation proposals, allocate a part of the excess return of a business to market 
(“user”) jurisdictions.  Thus, the second key question regarding a user participation 
proposal, namely, how, across the whole of the economy, one would determine to what 
degree users contribute to “value creation,” is conceptually parallel to the question of how, 
                                                 
in Human Behavior 516-27 (2016).  Additional projections suggest that thirty billion IoT devices by the year 
2020 may be a conservative estimate.  Global information firms estimate that the number of IoT devices 
connected worldwide already exceeds the thirty billion threshold, see IHS Markit, IoT Trend Watch 2018, at 
4 (2018), and industry professionals have proposed that the number of devices “could approach 100 billion 
by the end of 2040.”  See Kathryn Cave, What will the internet look like in 2040?, IDG Connect (Sept. 8, 
2015), https://www.idgconnect.com/blog-abstract/10383/what-internet-look-2040.  
76 Id.  IHS Markit, IoT Trend Watch 2018, at 4 (2018). 
77 See HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63, ¶ 3.7. 
78 See HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63, ¶¶ 3.62-3.75. 
79 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax 
on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM(2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/proposal_common_system_digital_services_tax_2
1032018_en.pdf.  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the 
corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/proposal_significant_digital_presence_21032018_
en.pdf. 
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across the whole of the economy, one would allocate a part of the excess return to market 
jurisdictions.  That is the “bridge” between the user participation proposal and the 
“marketing intangibles” or “DBRMPA” proposal described in Part III.  Importantly, this 
means that all of the technical and administrative issues that will be described in Part IIIB 
below also apply in equal measure to any user participation proposal.   
 
The principled issue is whether, how, and to what degree, across the whole of the economy, 
law should allocate the excess return of a business to consumer/user/market jurisdictions 
for corporate income tax purposes.  The key difference between the proposal described in 
Part III and the user participation theory is that the proposal in Part III does not attempt to 
ring-fence the digital economy.  Rather, it tackles this allocation question generally, 
without resorting to unsustainable and unjustifiable distinctions in business models.    
 
Part III.  Where We Go from Here:  Destination-Based Income Tax Reform?   
 
This Part considers the “marketing intangibles” or DBRMPA idea that constitutes a 
compromise between the current transfer pricing system and a destination-basis income 
tax.  This hybrid approach may be under consideration in some form or other at the OECD.  
My formulation of this approach may or may not be the same as what is under discussion 
at the OECD, as the proposal has not been publicly described in any detail.  However, no 
matter how a marketing intangibles concept is formulated, certain key issues will have to 
be addressed.  These include how to split excess returns between the current arm’s length 
system and an allocation to market countries, and how to determine destination so as to 
split the amount allocated to market countries among such countries.   
 
The DBRMPA described here is a compromise between the present transfer pricing system 
and a form of destination-based income tax known as a destination-based residual profit 
allocation (“DBRPA”).  The DBRMPA proposal divides intangible returns between those 
generated by so-called “customer-based” or marketing intangibles and those generated by 
other (presumably usually “production-based”) intangibles.  Residual returns deemed 
attributable to customer-based or marketing intangibles would be allocated to the market – 
the jurisdictions where the customers reside.  Residual returns deemed attributable to other 
intangibles would be allocated based on current transfer pricing rules (i.e., the BLTV).  
Importantly, in this sense the DBRMPA functions in the same way as user participation, 
but does so across the whole economy, instead of ring-fencing this change based on a cliff 
effect determined by whether a business is categorized as being “digitalized” or not. 
 
IIIA.  Background:  The Destination-Based Residual Profit Allocation 
 
The DBRPA proposal was developed by a group consisting of Alan Auerbach, Michael 
Devereaux, Michael Keen, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang Schön, and John Vella.  The idea is 
explained in the excellent paper authored by Joe Andrus and Paul Oosterhuis for this 
conference in 2016 entitled “Transfer Pricing After BEPS:  Where Are We and Where 
Should We Be Going.”  Further details appear in a presentation given by Paul Oosterhuis 
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at Oxford University in 2016.80  The proposal represents an attempt to move towards a 
destination-basis corporate income tax system by means that can at least be described as 
remaining consistent with some of the principles of the current “arm’s length” transfer 
pricing architecture.   
 
The DBRMPA is fundamentally a compromise between a destination-based residual profit 
allocation (DBRPA) and the current transfer pricing system.  Thus, analyzing the 
DBRMPA first and foremost requires understanding the DBRPA. 81   
 
The DBRPA proposal is animated by the understanding that the location of consumers is 
less mobile than the location of booked profits, intellectual property, corporate assets, 
corporate employees, or any other element of value creation.  In this sense it is similar to 
sales-based formulary apportionment.  However, the DBRPA attempts to separate “excess” 
or “residual” returns from “routine returns,” and provide a normal rate of return to 
productive functions.  The first-order advantages of a DBRPA are supposed to be reduced 
incentives to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions, reduced complexity and reduced 
administrative burdens.  
 
The core idea is to salvage the existing arm’s length system with respect to routine returns, 
while using a sales-based system to allocate residual returns.  How would it work?  To 
allocate excess/residual returns, the DBRPA deems the country in which customer sales 
take place to be an “entrepreneurial” affiliate with respect to local market sales, and 
ascribes all “non-routine” profits to that affiliate.82  Achieving this result would require 
MNCs to measure gross revenues by country and by product using some concept of 
“destination” or “place of supply.”  Global costs would need to be measured at a product 
line level, and then either traced or apportioned out to revenues from specific countries.   
 
The DBRPA mechanism for allocating the residual share to the market is quite similar to a 
cost-sharing approach for allocating income attributed to intangibles.  However, instead of 
allocating the residual profit to an “entrepreneurial risk-taker” in an MNC group defined 
                                                 
80  Id. at 89.  See Paul Oosterhuis, Skadden Arps LLP, Residual Profit Allocation Proposal at Oxford 
University Summer Conference 2016 (June 27, 2016), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjSxfUBMHnY&list=PLtXf43N26Zids6PowkWDV7oQo7HwoNspy
&index=8&t=0s; see also Michael Devereux, Residual Profit Allocation Proposal at Brookings / Tax Policy 
Center Conference on “A Corporate Tax for the 21st Century” (July 14, 2016), available at 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/residual-profit-allocation-proposal_2.pdf. 
81  Analyzing the DBRMPA is also easier if one is familiar with formulary apportionment, sales-based 
formulary apportionment, and residual formulary apportionment.  Those ideas, as well as the DBRPA, were 
described in a paper for the 2016 iteration of this conference authored by Joe Andrus & Paul Oosterhuis 
entitled “Transfer Pricing After BEPS:  Where Are We and Where Should We Be Going,” available at 
https://www.skadden.com/-/media/files/publications/2017/03/transfer-pricing-
afterbepswhereareweandwhereshould.pdf.  Given the relative consistency of participation in the University 
of Chicago conference, in this Part I often assume familiarity with the excellent Andrus & Oosterhuis paper.  
Readers wishing to refresh their memory of formulary apportionment, RFA and DBRPA as well as some of 
the issues that arise with those proposals are directed to pages 96 to 104 of that paper. 
82 See Michael Devereux, supra note 80. 
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as the affiliate that owns the intangible property and takes on financial risk (as in 
contemporary cost-sharing models), the residual profit is instead allocated to affiliates in 
the respective market jurisdictions.  The proposal in effect imposes deemed contractual 
arrangements to which traditional transfer pricing methods are then applied.  As a result, 
the DBRPA allocates excess returns on a product line by product line basis rather than an 
entity by entity basis.  In doing so it appropriately escapes the “formulary apportionment” 
label.   
 
Comparison of DBRPA with Sales-Based Formulary Apportionment 
 
The most important difference between a DBRPA and sales-based formulary 
apportionment (“FA”) is that a DBRPA would modify transfer pricing methodologies so 
as to allocate only “excess” or “residual” profits to the jurisdiction of sale.83  Sales-based 
formulary apportionment systems do not necessarily allocate any income to jurisdictions 
where corporate functions takes place.  In the US, our status as a very large market obscures 
this concern that sales-based formulary apportionment raises.  But consider a small 
jurisdiction; let’s call it Denmark.  Whatever the theoretical merits, it is probably hard for 
politicians to explain to Danish taxpayers that a Danish corporation which exploits a range 
of local benefits to make outputs that are wholly or almost wholly exported will pay no or 
almost no corporate income tax in Denmark.  The cost-plus markup on productive 
functions in the DBRPA is somewhat responsive to the concern that sales-based formulary 
apportionment provides no revenue to jurisdictions where economic activity takes place.  
It solves the “Denmark problem” to some degree. 
 
Although DBRPA is not a sales-based FA proposal, in many circumstances DBRPA could 
produce results that are similar to the residual sales-based formulary apportionment 
(“RFA”) proposal put forth by Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst in 2011.  RFA would 
allocate a fixed markup (7.5% in the Durst et al proposal) on costs to entities that undertake 
activity within an MNC. 84  All other profits would then be allocated to the 
destination/market country.   
 
The key difference between DBRPA and RFA is that DBRPA imposes a destination-basis 
allocation for residual returns on a product line by product line and individualized country 
by country basis.85  If percentage of gross sales revenue on the one hand and percentage of 
corporate profit on the other vary significantly by country, DBRPA and RFA would 
generate different results.86  Similarly, if average profit levels vary by product line and 
some countries generate more revenue for an MNE from high-profit products while other 
                                                 
83 See Michael Devereux, supra note 80. 
84 Michael C. Durst et al, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes:  A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary 
Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 498, at 540-41 (2009). 
85 In contrast, RFA results in a single allocation (or perhaps a QBU by QBU allocation) of the average global 
profits of an entire multinational group.   
86 Unlike RFA, DBRPA would also keep transfer pricing lawyers and economists productively employed. 
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countries generate more revenue for an MNE from low-profit products, DBRPA and RFA 
would generate different results.87   
 
DBRPA requires determining where sales occur.  Andrus and Oosterhuis correctly observe 
that using location of sales to allocate income “raises several particularly difficult issues,81 
including:  the treatment of remote sales, the treatment of sales through intermediaries, the 
treatment of sales of raw materials, components and intermediate goods, the treatment of 
capital goods sales and the treatment of services.”88  At minimum, addressing these issues 
would require augmented information exchange and potentially some degree of collection 
assistance.  These issues also have first-order ramifications for DBRMPA, and so are 
addressed further below.  Another important issue discussed below is that, like both sales-
based formulary apportionment and RFA, DBRPA likely requires countries to agree on 
rules that define the corporate income tax base.   
 
Other technical questions also arise in thinking about DBRPA.89  Such issues include the 
treatment of losses, the treatment of flow-through entities, the treatment of certain financial 
transactions, and the treatment of M&A.  In addition, financial accounting treatment may 
be problematic, and there are important questions about the compatibility of these ideas 
with tax treaties and international trade commitments.  These issues were outlined in the 
2016 Andrus and Oosterhuis effort.  I do not rehash that discussion below, although these 
concerns may be relevant to a DBRMPA as well.   
 
IIIB.  Destination-Based Residual Marketing Profit Allocation  
 
A DBRMPA has the same starting point as a DBRPA:  affiliates of an MNE are 
compensated for their functions on a cost plus or return on assets basis using arm’s length 
principles.  Unlike in the DBRPA, however, the “residual return” must then be divided 
between marketing or customer-based intangibles and other intangibles.  This division is 
necessary in order to then allocate income deemed to arise from customer-based or 
marketing intangibles to the market of destination for the good or service, while allocating 
the remaining residual return under existing transfer pricing principles.   
 
Going forward in this Part I will use the term “marketing intangibles.”  There may very 
well be a substantive distinction between marketing intangibles and customer-based 
intangibles.  For example, in the US core deposits of a financial institution were historically 
thought of as a “customer-based” intangible, but might not be a marketing intangible.  
Similarly, the value of a “network effect” might be considered a “customer-based” 
                                                 
87 One industry where the difference between DBRPA and RFA could be important is pharmaceuticals.  In 
that industry more than 40% of profits globally are generated in the United States, even though less than 40% 
of sales occur here. 
88 Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, at 89-99. 
89 Cf.  Mitchell Kane, Transfer Pricing, Integration, and Synergy Intangibles:  A Consensus Approach to the 
Arm’s Length Standard, 6 World Tax J. 282 (2014). 
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intangible but not a marketing intangible.90  However, in this discussion I explicitly do not 
intend to invoke such substantive distinctions.  I am simply choosing a single term 
(marketing intangibles) for ease of exposition.91 
 
The conceptual motivation for the DBRMPA derives from at least two sources.  First, some 
believe certain export-driven jurisdictions would adamantly reject a DBRPA.  However, at 
least two of the most prominent of these jurisdictions, Germany and Japan, may believe 
that the intangible value held by their domestically-headquartered corporations derives 
primarily from production intangibles rather than from marketing intangibles.  Thus, these 
jurisdictions (the theory presumably goes) might be willing to accept a DBRMPA.  Second, 
some policymakers may believe that marketing intangibles are fundamentally “customer-
based,” and therefore more appropriately allocated to jurisdictions of destination (“the 
market”) than is income attributable to other intangibles.   
 
Both of these premises are subject to doubt.  For purposes of this paper, however, I will set 
those two questions aside and limit myself to administrative and pragmatic issues 
associated with the DBRMPA.  This drafting decision is not because I’m persuaded by the 
premises described above.   
 
The DBRMPA raises three basic administrative concerns.  First, it retains all of the 
problems of current transfer pricing law, because with respect to residual returns that are 
not allocated to the marketing intangibles current law applies.  Second, the proposal 
imposes an inadministrable distinction between residual returns associated with marketing 
intangibles and other residual returns.  Third, since a DBRMPA allocates residual returns 
associated with marketing intangibles to the market jurisdiction, all the challenges 
associated with any destination-basis income tax proposal are present in the DBRMPA.    
 
The problems of current transfer pricing law are well-known, and were also discussed in 
Part IA.  Part IIIB.1. discusses historical evidence suggesting that the distinction between 
marketing intangibles and other intangibles is not administrable, and also considers various 
potential solutions to that concern.  Part IIIB.2. discusses the difficulties associated with 
determining destination for purposes of allocating revenues in a destination-basis income 
tax.  There are two sub-issues.  First, mechanisms used in the VAT to determine destination 
do not work in an income tax.  Second, solutions to determine destination by building on 
existing income tax-based concepts are insufficiently robust.  Part IIIB.3. describes the 
difficulties that arise because the DBRMPA relies on unitary tax principles for purposes of 
allocating costs, but not for purposes of determining revenues.  Part IIIB.4. concludes that 
the DBRMPA, while it seems attractive as a political compromise at 100,000 feet, entails 
a level of complexity and embedded sources for further conflict as between sovereigns and 
                                                 
90 Oosterhuis & Parsons, Destination-Based Income Taxation:  Neither Principled nor Practical?, 71 Tax. 
L. Rev. 515 (2018). 
91 Indeed the term “marketing intangible” seems like a bit of a misnomer to me; the term “market 
intangible” might be more appropriate. Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion I use the term “marketing 
intangible” because it is the one that has been used most often in the current debate. 
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as between sovereigns and multinationals that is problematic.  It also would require a 
significant degree of international tax harmonization. 
 
IIIB.1.  Dividing a Residual Return Between Marketing-Based and Other 
Intangibles 
 
The DBRMPA raises an important and likely technically irresolvable point of controversy:  
the extent to which residual returns are attributable to customer-based or other intangible 
assets. 
 
A legislative definition of “marketing” or “customer-based” intangibles would presumably 
be required to operationalize a basic DBRMPA proposal.  One could certainly imagine 
such definitions.  For example, a statute might define income associated with patents, 
copyrights, trade secrets, and any other intangible clearly related to product function or 
composition as “production-based” intangible income, and specify that all other income 
not allocated to a routine return was “marketing intangible” income.  Alternatively, a 
statute could define marketing intangibles to include trademarks, tradenames, and 
franchises as well as the value of installed customer bases, expectation of future business 
from that base, and goodwill and going concern value.   
 
A working legislative definition does not solve the underlying valuation problem.  
Conceptually the DBRMPA requires valuation of all “marketing intangibles” as distinct 
from all other intangibles in order to produce a ratio via which all residual income could 
be divided between marketing intangible income (which in this usage can equivalently be 
called “customer-based intangible income”) and other intangible income.   
 
This issue – distinguishing between customer-based intangibles and other intangibles – is 
not new for US law.  Prior to enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, many categories of intangibles were eligible for income forecast depreciation, often 
on accelerated schedules.92  As a result the value of customer-based intangibles as opposed 
to patents and other intangibles acquired in various transactions had to be determined.  
Amortization deductions before 1993 depended on the acquirer’s ability to establish that 
an acquired intangible had a limited useful life that could be established with reasonable 
accuracy and an ascertainable value separate from goodwill, since goodwill was 
nonamortizable.93  Amortizable intangibles were then amortized under various useful lives.   
 
In contrast, section 197 spreads amortization over a 15-year straight line period, without 
regard to their “type.”  Section 197 obviates the need to ascertain individual valuations for 
different categories of intangibles, and greatly diminishes the incentive taxpayers once had 
                                                 
92 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-285 (1979-2 C.B. 91). 
93 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); Gregory Beil, Internal Revenue Code Section 197:  A Cure for 
the Controversy over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets, 79 U. Miami L. Rev. 731 (1995) 
(providing discussion of prior law regulations and the surrounding case law). 
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to characterize acquired intangibles as assets distinguishable from goodwill and going 
concern value. 
 
Fred Goldberg, a former Commissioner of the IRS, explained the administrative problem 
created by prior law to Congress in 1992, shortly after he left the job of Commissioner of 
the IRS and became the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy.  He testified 
that the need to allocate basis among purchased intangibles not only resulted in substantial 
uncertainty and dissimilar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, but also imposed large 
wasteful transaction and administrative costs on taxpayers and the government.  Before 
1993, disputes over the amortization of customer-based or market-based intangibles, 
including but not limited to items such as core deposits held by financial institutions, 
insurance expirations, and newspaper and magazine subscription lists, produced many 
prominent, large dollar litigations. 94   As one author described the problem, “the 
governance of purchase price allocations to intangible assets [has become] an 
administrative quagmire and a judicial disaster.”95 
 
For tax years between 1979 and 1987, for all unresolved audit cases (on any issue) in 
examination, appeals, or litigation as of mid 1989, in fully 70 percent of those cases in 
which taxpayers claimed that an intangible assets had a determinable useful life over which 
amortization was available, the IRS proposed adjustments and claimed that the assets were 
in fact goodwill.96  Moreover, for that same period, the single category of intangible assets 
over which this dispute arose most often were customer or market-based intangibles.97  The 
debate before 1993 regarding acquired intangibles largely focused on distinguishing 
between customer-based intangibles and goodwill, the latter of which was not amortizable 
under pre-1993 law.  But the core problem was allocating purchase price premia across 
intangible asset categories generally.   
 
This same issue – whether an intangible is a customer or market-based intangible or some 
other intangible (goodwill or something else) would arise in a new guise in a regime that 
distinguishes between “marketing intangibles” and other intangibles.  As long as one result 
is more favorable for the taxpayer on the one hand or the government on the other, or for 
one government or another, incentives for controversies regarding classification arise.  But 
relative to pre-1993 US law, the difference would be that instead of being limited to cases 
where intangibles were acquired, the controversy would arise with respect to every single 
cross-border transaction in which a non-routine return existed.  The intangible 
                                                 
94 See Tax Treatment on Intangible Assets:  Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., United States Senate, on S. 
1245, H.R. 3035, and H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1992) (testimony of Hon. Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., 
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury and former IRS Commissioner) [hereinafter 
“Hearings”]. 
95  Jon D. Kitchel, A Tax Policy Analysis of Recent Legislative Proposals Regarding the Treatment of 
Goodwill, 92 Tax Notes Today 252-89 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
96 US Gen. Acct. Off., Tax Policy:  Issues and Policy Proposals Regarding the Tax Treatment of Intangible 
Assets 10 (1991) (report to the Joint Committee on Taxation). 
97 Id.  It is difficult to understate how serious the intangible asset categorization problem was thought to be 
in the period before the adoption of section 197.     
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classification incentive of a foreign sovereign where any DEMPE functions took place and 
the incentives of the IRS would always be at cross-purposes.  To paraphrase Fred 
Goldberg’s 1992 congressional testimony regarding the analogous issue a generation ago, 
if we go down this path, “[n]o amount of after the fact enforcement and litigation can 
possibly remedy the situation.”98  We will have re-created a mess from a generation ago 
and compounded it exponentially.   
 
IIIB.1.a.  A “Two Sided” Valuation Solution?  
 
Another key difficulty with a DBRMPA arises from the fact that, like the DBRPA, this is 
a transactional method.  The DPRMPA therefore has the complexity associated with 
determining profit levels on a product line by product line and country-by-country basis.    
 
However, the DBRMPA differs from the DBRPA in that it requires a profit split of the 
residual profit being allocated for each transaction between profits attributed to marketing 
intangibles and other residual profits.  A methodology must be chosen to undertake this 
profit split.99  In transfer pricing terms, on first impression a DBRMPA would seem to 
require application of the transactional profit split method to all transactions, even where 
only one party makes unique and valuable contributions.  
 
We’ve spent years in transfer pricing trying to limit the use of the transactional profit split 
method.  The OECD’s recent guidance on the application of the transactional profit split 
explains why:  “[a] weakness of the transactional profit split method relates to difficulties 
in its application.”100  As a result, the OECD perspective is that “where the accurate 
delineation of the transaction determines that one party to the transaction performs only 
simple functions, does not assume economically significant risks in relation to the 
transaction and does not otherwise make any contribution which is unique and valuable, a 
transactional profit split method typically would not be appropriate.”101  For the same 
reason, the OECD maintains that “a lack of comparables alone is insufficient to warrant 
the use of a transactional profit split.”102  
 
In various high-profile cases over the years, the application of the transactional profit split 
produced highly intractable disputes between taxpayers and governments and between 
                                                 
98 See Hearings, supra note 94. 
99 For the method to function effectively, the transactions associated with a product line will also need to be 
accurately delineated.  Depending on policy choices and the facts as issue, the DBRMPA may more fully 
import all the complexity associated with determining the appropriate level of aggregation and accurately 
delineating the transactions to be covered that arises in the transactional profit split method of the current 
transfer pricing guidelines than would a pure DBRPA.   
100  OECD, Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method:  Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS:  Action 10, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, ¶ 2.123 (2018), 
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/revised-guidance-on-the-application-of-the-transactional-profitsplit-method-beps-
action-10.pdf [hereinafter “OECD Action 10”]. 
101 Id.  ¶ 2.127. 
102 Id.  ¶ 2.148. 
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competent authorities in governments.  One well-remembered example is the IRS transfer 
pricing dispute with Glaxo SmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. & Subsidiaries (“GSK”) 
for the tax years 1989-2005.103  The essence of the dispute was over the level of US profits 
reported by GSK after making intercompany payments that needed to take into account 
production intangibles developed by and trademarks owned by its UK parent, relative to 
the value of GSK’s marketing intangibles in the US.104   
 
The facts of the GSK case required coordination between the US and the UK with respect 
to what current OECD transfer pricing guidelines would describe as a two-sided 
transactional profit split.  The public record suggests the UK government never acceded to 
the US assertion as to the share of the GSK profits that were attributable to US marketing 
intangibles rather than UK production intangibles.105  The GSK case is particularly well-
remembered, and the size of the dispute was unusual, but the basic setup is not unique.  
 
Two-sided transactional profit splits lend themselves to requiring intergovernmental 
coordination through MAP to avoid double juridical taxation.  Even after the BEPS project 
and the advent of the multilateral instrument, mandatory binding arbitration is still 
available only in a limited set of MAP cases, and the risk of failures of MAP coordination 
remains high in transactional profit splits.  Sometimes, maybe this is just the way it has to 
be.  But why would we want to adopt an international tax system that sets up this exact 
type of dispute between taxpayers and governments and as between national tax 
administrations in every case; including in the broad swath of cases where everyone 
previously agreed the transactional profit split method had no relevance?106   
 
IIIB.1.b.  A Relative “Capitalized Expenditure” Approach? 
 
Another potential approach to splitting residual profit between profits being allocated to 
marketing intangibles and profits being allocated to other intangibles could involve 
specifying which expenditures contribute to developing marketing intangibles and which 
expenditures contribute to developing other intangibles.  Governments would then 
presumably establish “useful lives” for various buckets of expenditure.  The resulting 
relative “capitalized values” associated with marketing intangibles as compared to other 
                                                 
103 Robert Guy Matthews & Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo to Settle Tax Dispute with IRS Over US Unit for $3.4 
Billion, Wall St. J. (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115798715531459461.  At the time it 
represented the largest tax dispute in the history of the Internal Revenue Service, and it ended when GSK 
made the largest settlement payment in history. 
104 News Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Accepts Settlement Offer in Largest Transfer Pricing Dispute 
(Sept. 11, 2006), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-accepts-settlement-offer-in-largest-transfer-pricing-
dispute. 
105 See, e.g., Gareth Green, The U.K. Reaction to the Glaxo Case, Tax Planning International Transfer Pricing, 
BNA (Nov. 2006). 
106 Cf. OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶ 2.127.  (“[W]here the accurate delineation of the transaction 
determines that one party to the transaction performs only simple functions, does not assume economically 
significant risks in relation to the transaction and does not otherwise make any contribution which is unique 
and valuable, a transactional profit split method typically would not be appropriate since a share of profits… 
would be unlikely to represent an arm’s length outcome for such contributions or risk assumption.”) 
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intangibles would produce a ratio.  The ratio would change each year as a result of both 
new expenditures by the MNC and the operation of whatever “amortization schedule” was 
adopted for the various buckets of expenditure.  The “amortization schedule” would not 
produce actual deductions; it would simply establish the annual ratio of “marketing 
intangibles” to “other intangibles.”  That ratio (as it adjusted each year, presumably on a 
product line by product line basis), would provide the ratio of excess return to be allocated 
through the current arm’s length system as opposed to being assigned to market 
jurisdictions for each specified product line.   
 
Something akin to this approach is said to have been used in some advanced pricing 
agreements entered into by some multinationals both with the IRS and with foreign tax 
administrations.  But generalizing this approach would be very resource intensive.  
Moreover, the approach transmutes the debate as to what constitutes a “marketing” or 
“customer-based” intangible as opposed to other intangibles into a debate as to what costs 
develop a “marketing intangible” and what costs develop other intangibles (e.g. production 
intangibles) and what the respective useful lives of such expenditures should be.107  It is 
unclear to me that this represents a meaningful improvement on the basic two-sided 
DBRMPA method described in Part IIIB.1.a. above.  It certainly highlights the relationship 
between the problem of relative valuation in a DBRMPA and the useful life issues section 
197 was enacted to eliminate.   
 
Finally, the relative capitalized expenditure approach is hard to translate into the context 
of the digital business models that are at the heart of this debate.  Which expenditures can 
be attributed to creating “network effects,” and thereby a form of “marketing intangible?”  
Considered prima facie as an intellectual matter, arguably few or none.  But is that an 
answer that would be globally accepted? 
 
IIIB.1.c.  A “One-Sided” Valuation Solution? 
 
The central problem described above in Parts IIIB.1.a. and IIIB.1.b. arises as a result of the 
attempt to put relative values on the intangibles associated with “marketing intangibles” as 
compared to other intangibles.  Again, in IIIB.1.a. valuing “marketing intangibles” and 
“other intangibles” respectively is just a mechanism to create the ratio of excess return to 
be allocated through the current arm’s length system as opposed to being assigned to 
market jurisdictions.  IIIB.1.b., produces the same ratio through a relative “capitalized 
asset” approach.   
 
Another alternative to resolve the relative valuation marketing intangible/other intangible 
allocation problem would be to value the excess return that should be ascribed to 
                                                 
107  Moreover, as the OECD correctly observes in the context of cost-based profit splitting factors in a 
transactional profit split, this approach “can be very sensitive to differences and changes in accounting 
classification of costs.  It is therefore necessary to clearly identify in advance what costs will be taken into 
account … and to determine the factor consistently among the parties.”  OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶ 
2.182. 
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specifically listed production intangibles.  The system could then allocate the residual – 
that is to say, the excess return remaining after subtracting the return given to non-routine 
production intangibles – to the “marketing bucket” and assign it to market jurisdictions on 
a destination-basis.   
 
This one-sided DBRMPA method would avoid the problem described in Parts IIIB.1.a. and 
IIIB.1.b. with respect to dividing residual returns between marketing intangibles (the 
market) and other intangibles (the current transfer pricing system) using a ratio.  Instead, 
one could imagine using a one-sided method by attempting to locate a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction for non-routine production intangibles,108 or by applying a profit 
indicator, for example a return on costs associated with specified production intangibles 
(or some other net profit indicator).   
 
This latter approach (a one-sided profit indicator approach) is similar to the OECD’s 
“transactional net margin method” (“TNMM”) (known in the US as a comparable profits 
method), but with one important difference.  The OECD transfer pricing guidelines specify 
that a TNMM is only supposed to be applied when one of the two parties owns and controls 
all the relevant non-routine intangibles.   
 
MNCs would be incentivized to adapt tax planning to a one-sided DBRMPA, which would 
value the return to “marketing intangibles” as a residual after a return is ascribed to non-
routine production intangibles.  In a one-sided DBRMPA world with DEMPE rules (i.e. 
the BLTV) for the allocation of the return ascribed to production intangibles, MNCs would 
seek to a) locate their production intangibles in low tax jurisdictions and b) maximize the 
valuations for their production intangibles.  Nevertheless, because excess returns are so 
large for the world’s leading companies, the one-sided methodology DBRMPA, which 
ascribes a specified return to production intangibles and gives everything else to the 
market, would likely allocate most (high) excess returns to the market/marketing 
intangibles.  
 
A one-sided DBRMPA methodology that values only specified production intangibles is 
intellectually distinguishable from a DBRPA.  However, as a practical matter the one-sided 
DBRMPA produces a result that asymptotically approaches the outcome in a DBRPA.  It 
also has all the issues associated with determining destination in DBRPA, without 
achieving one of the DBRPA’s virtues, which is eliminating the administrative problems 
associated with current transfer pricing law.   
 
                                                 
108 The Tax Court resolved part of the recent Amazon transfer pricing dispute using a technique akin to the 
one-sided DBRMPA method I describe here using a comparable uncontrolled transaction.  Unlike in a 
TNMM, in the Amazon case all parties agreed that non-routine intangibles were controlled by both related 
parties to the transaction.  Nevertheless, Judge Lauber’s opinion adopted a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction methodology for determining the return that should be attributed to Amazon’s website technology 
– the intangibles that would presumably be considered “production intangibles,” in a DBRMPA, and treated 
the remainder of the residual return as allocable to a non-US party.   
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It should also be noted that the reason the DBRPA is not currently under consideration 
internationally does not appear to be related to whether it is normatively defensible.  
Rather, the DBRPA is not part of the debate because it is politically unpalatable to a number 
of major jurisdictions and other constituencies that oppose allocating all or most of the 
residual return from intangible assets to market jurisdictions.  The one-sided DBRMPA 
methodology could be politically unpalatable to those same jurisdictions and other 
constituencies.   
 
Finally, one should note that the one-sided DBRMPA methodology described above is in 
some sense the inverse of the “digital investment” idea put forth by Wolfgang Schön.109  
Schön’s idea treats “digital investment” as the functional equivalent of the “marketing 
intangible” in the DBRMPA.  Schön suggests that market-specific digital investment 
should be measured, and the return associated with that investment should be valued using 
a TNMM-type approach and allocated to market jurisdictions.  How that measurement 
would be accomplished is not entirely clear, but Schön’s idea is quite interesting.  It could 
be integrated into the current transfer pricing system more easily than any DBRMPA 
concept.  And the digital investment concept certainly would not asymptotically approach 
a DBRPA.  It is unclear whether the Schön’s proposal is being considered as a mechanism 
to implement the marketing intangibles idea.  However, the terminology used by Schön 
and the terminology that has been used publicly to date in the marketing intangibles 
discussion do not overlap.   
 
IIIB.1.d.  A “Formulary DBRMPA” Solution? 
 
Some might acknowledge the problems of allocating between production intangibles and 
marketing intangibles based on either a “two-sided” or a “one-sided” transfer pricing 
method, and then suggest that the issue should simply be resolved by agreeing a percentage 
allocation to the market.  For instance, governments could agree that distinguishing 
between market intangibles and other intangibles was not systematically administrable, and 
therefore the excess return should just be divided based on fixed percentages (50/50) 
between market jurisdictions and the existing arm’s length standard (the BLTV).  A 
formulary approach clearly does address the allocation problems described above with 
respect to the DBRMPA as between marketing intangibles and other intangibles.  Moreover, 
it does so without asymptotically approaching a DBRPA.  
 
However, formulary DBRMPA likely raises the issues traditional formulary apportionment 
raised in the United States.  In other words, because activity is mobile, but sales are not, 
jurisdictions would be incentivized to abandon a 50/50 split and move in the direction of a 
100% allocation to destination.   
 
US states use a formulary apportionment system to determine their taxable share of US-
source corporate profits.  The basic mechanics of a formulary apportionment system, in 
                                                 
109 Wolfgang Schön, supra note 49, at 79-81. 
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which intercompany transactions are generally ignored, are thus familiar to most US tax 
lawyers.  A generation ago US state corporate tax apportionment formulas were based on 
a weighted average of the shares of sales, payroll, and assets in the state.110  However, these 
formulas create an implicit excise tax on the factors used in the formula.111  As a result, the 
three-factor formula discourages MNCs from investing in assets or generating employment 
in high-tax locations. 
 
Over the years the states of the United States shifted (in inconsistent ways) away from 
three-factor apportionment towards sales-only apportionment factors to gain a competitive 
advantage in attracting tangible investment and jobs.112  In the international setting, with 
higher tax rates than state income taxes and fewer coordination mechanisms to limit 
competition, most serious commentators agree that this dynamic would be more intense.  
Moreover, customers are much less mobile than employment in the cross-border setting, 
so economic theory would suggest that a sales-based apportionment should produce fewer 
economic distortions than an apportionment formula that took location of employment into 
account.113  
 
Formulary DBRMPA would crystalize the problems of the BLTV.  Research consistently 
shows that high skilled – DEMPE-capable – labor is the most mobile form of labor globally 
(certainly more mobile than the payroll and assets factors of traditional formulary 
apportionment).  Meanwhile consumers are quite immobile.  The dichotomy between an 
apportionment factor that is immobile and an apportionment factor that is highly mobile, 
with fixed percentages to each, creates an implicit excise tax on the mobile factor.  That 
reality would likely push countries in the direction of unilaterally choosing a 100% 
allocation to the immobile factor (the location of the consumer), in order to eliminate the 
implicit excise tax on high-skilled jobs that the 50/50 split would create, just as US states 
over-weighted sales and abandoned the payroll factor to encourage job creation in their 
jurisdictions.  Moreover, in the international system, even more than at the level of the US 
states, it is not clear what enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure that countries abide by 
an agreed 50/50 split.  Bilateral tax treaties are not well-suited to enshrining such an 
approach. 
 
The one potential solution I see to the pressures created by the formulary DBRMPA’s 
implicit excise tax on DEMPE jobs in higher tax jurisdictions is to abandon the BLTV.  
Governments could decide to revert to pre-BEPS transfer pricing guidelines for the part of 
the excess return attributed to other intangibles and allocated under transfer pricing rules.  
In that world, contractual allocations of risk would be more fully respected and income 
                                                 
110 The year 1978 was the high water mark for three factor apportionment at the state level in the United 
States.  See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A US Subnational Perspective on the “Logic” of Taxing Income on a 
“Market” Basis, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018). 
111 See e.g., Charles E. McClure, Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax:  Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (Henry Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980). 
112 See Hellerstein, supra note 110. 
113  For similar reasons, most academic observers agree that formulary apportionment employed 
internationally would probably be implemented (sooner or later) under a single factor sales-based formulary 
apportionment system.  
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shifting for the “other intangibles” portion of excess returns would be somewhat easier than 
under current law.  But shifting income would not require shifting well-paying (and highly 
mobile) jobs out of higher tax jurisdictions.  Reverting to the pre-BEPS transfer pricing 
guidelines therefore would reduce the otherwise inevitable pressure for countries to 
unilaterally move from a DBRMPA to a 100% allocation of the excess return to the market 
jurisdiction. 
 
IIIB.2.  Problems with Relying on Destination for Income Tax Purposes  
 
In any system that allocates part of the return to the market (in other words, any 
“destination-basis” system) the tax burden is meant to rest in the jurisdiction of the final 
consumer, rather than the jurisdiction of residence of any intermediaries in the supply 
chain.  The economic rationale for this result is that the final consumer is thought to be the 
least mobile factor.  Thus, from a theoretical economics perspective, a destination-basis 
system is less economically distortive than other more mobile bases for assessing corporate 
tax.114 
 
However, if the administrative mechanism for measuring the location of sales does not 
conform to the location of the final consumer, this justification for attempting to tax at 
destination is undermined.  Importantly, multinationals can easily structure their transfer 
pricing arrangements to book sales income in a jurisdiction that is not the jurisdiction of 
residence of the final consumer and are incentivized to do so if they can lower their tax 
burden as a result.   
 
The US international income tax system has been cognizant of this category of issue for 
decades; it is at the heart of both the 20th century understanding of section 482 and the 1962 
foreign base company sales income rules.   
 
For the same reason, every destination-basis income tax proposal relies on a concept of 
destination separate and apart from the contractual decision MNCs make about where to 
book sales.  Andrus and Oosterhuis, as well as other commentators, in effect suggest that 
concepts for determining destination that have evolved outside the United States for 
purposes of implementing the value-added tax might be modified for purposes of 
administering a DBRMPA.115  The VAT does effectively establish destination by means 
of proxies and administrative solutions in the consumption tax context in most cases.  The 
                                                 
114 See, e.g., Alan Auerbach et al., Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation, Oxford Univ. Ctr. For Bus. 
Taxation, Working Paper (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_
17/WP1701b.pdf. 
115 See, e.g., Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, at 99.  (“These issues may be novel in the income tax 
context, but not in the value-added tax context; the evolving thinking on these issues in the latter context can 
thus be a useful guide.”) 
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difficulty is that the mechanisms the VAT uses for this purpose simply are not amenable 
to implementation in an income tax.116 
 
IIIB.2.a.  Inapplicability of VAT Best Practices 
 
The VAT generally resolves the issue of determining destination using the credit-invoice 
mechanism.  Two of the most important features of the credit-invoice mechanism are 
taxation on gross amounts and imposition of tax on every transfer, both intra-firm and inter-
firm. 
 
An income tax cannot adopt the credit-invoice mechanism for one key reason:  income 
taxes tax net income, rather than gross revenues.  In an income tax cross-border business 
input purchases are generally deductible.  In contrast, the VAT establishes destination in 
large measure by providing cross-border business input purchases a treatment that is the 
equivalent of non-deductibility.117   
 
Destination of Goods 
 
For tangible goods, VAT laws generally assess VAT using frontier or border controls.118  
Imported goods are in effect treated as having the destination of the jurisdiction where they 
clear customs.  VAT is assessed on the full value of the good as it enters the jurisdiction.  
VAT laws then free exports of VAT through a combination of non-inclusion of proceeds 
and a refund mechanism for VAT previously paid.  As a result, the VAT avoids the 
difficulties a destination-basis income tax would have with cross-border sales through third 
party intermediaries.   
 
The reason third party cross-border intermediation does not obscure destination in the VAT 
is that the intermediary pays a full tax on its purchases, and has the full amount refunded 
                                                 
116 In a credit-method VAT, registered businesses assess tax on taxable goods and services they sell each 
time they supply such a good or service to either a business or a consumer.  Registered businesses are then 
permitted to reduce the amount of VAT they are liable to remit to the government by a credit equal to the 
amount of VAT paid to other registered businesses in purchasing business inputs (intermediate goods, 
services, plant and equipment, etc.).  The credit eliminates the VAT on goods and services used by a 
registered business, but leaves in place the VAT on sales to final consumers.  This mechanism ensures that 
the consumption of all goods and services subject to the VAT will be taxed once, but only once, generally at 
the consumer level.  Imposing the VAT on a destination-basis requires a border adjustment.  To eliminate 
the tax paid on an exported good by businesses at earlier stages in the production and distribution process, 
exporters receive a credit (and therefore perhaps a refund) for tax paid on their inputs in a credit-invoice 
method system, while no tax is assessed on their sales. 
117  The VAT mechanism works cross-border and is not equivalent to a tariff because the VAT credit 
mechanism then provides a credit to registered businesses (and not to consumers).  The whole tax is passed 
on to consumers; businesses bear none of it.  In contrast, in an income tax, businesses are intended to pay 
tax.  As a result, the full credit mechanism is not an option in an income tax. 
118 VAT on imports is generally collected at the same time as customs duties, although in some countries 
collection is postponed until declared on the importer’s next VAT return. 
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on re-export.  Exports are not included in the tax base, and then a tax based on the sales 
price of the good is collected at the jurisdiction of (further) destination.  A similar result 
applies with respect to importation of intermediate inputs (whether raw materials, 
components, or intermediate goods) that are subsequently exported as part of a different 
tangible good, and (thanks to expensing) even with respect to capital goods that are 
purchased to allow for the manufacture of other products for export. 119  In all cases the 
credit-input system thereby moves the tax burden to the final buyer.   
 
This VAT system for ensuring that tax is collected at destination only works because the 
system taxes on a gross basis and refunds on every intra-firm and inter-firm transfer.  An 
income tax cannot adopt this basic element of the credit-invoice mechanism as it operates 
in cross-border situations and remain a tax on net income.  As a result, the VAT does not 
provide useful guidance for resolving problems of destination of goods in an income tax 
system. 
 
Location of Services 
 
Determining the destination of cross-border trade in services and intangibles more 
generally has been a key issue in reforming the VAT for the 21st century. 120  Since there 
are no customs controls to impose the VAT at the point of importation on services and 
intangibles, creating administrable proxies for the destination principle in services and 
intangibles is challenging.  The OECD has developed special guidelines for determining 
the jurisdiction of taxation for international supplies of services and intangibles over the 
last decade that attempt to reflect the destination principle.    
 
Determining the location of services raises especially difficult issues in the MNC 
context.121  In many cases, MNC service recipients utilize the services of a service provider 
in multiple jurisdictions.  The country that the services are billed to can become a 
mechanism for manipulation in a DBRMPA.   
 
Charge-out mechanisms of the kind used in today’s income tax system can and do 
conceptually resolve the problem of determining the destination of services an MNC 
recipient receives and uses in multiple locations in the VAT context.122  However, the 
difficulty raised by this solution for tax administrations in the DBRMPA context is 
                                                 
119 Of course, income taxes cannot provide expensing treatment in all cases while maintaining their status as 
income taxes.   
120 Walter Hellerstein & Michael Keen, Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT, 63 Tax L. Rev. 359 
(2010). 
121 See Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promised Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary 
Apportionment, 61 Tax L. Rev. 169, at 208 (2008) and Hellerstein, supra note 110, at 9-12, for a discussion 
of these issues. 
122 Note also that to solve the problem of determining where globally-provided MNC to MNC services are 
“consumed,” most VATs today generally follow the result achieved for purpose of corporate income tax 
chargeouts.  It is obviously no answer to rely on the VAT to solve an income tax problem if the present law 
VAT solution is to rely on the income tax answer to solve that same problem. 
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different and should not be trivialized.  Tax administrations would need to audit service 
recipients to determine whether charge-outs had been made appropriately in order to 
inform their audit of the service provider.  While charge outs can be a subject of audit in 
today’s income tax system, tax administrators never need to ask whether charge outs by an 
unrelated party change the tax result for a separate, unrelated taxpayer.  The level of 
internal coordination such a system would require of government auditors simply does not 
exist today within tax administrations.   
 
IIIB.2.b.  Known Solutions Building on Income Tax Administrative Concepts Are 
Insufficiently Robust 
 
As noted above, sales through third party distributors would raise substantial avoidance 
and/or enforcement issues for a DBRMPA.  Since the administrative features of the VAT 
cannot help, other anti-abuse rules would be needed in a DBRMPA to address the tax 
incentive to structure operations to have customers purchase products through a third-party 
distributor in a low-tax jurisdiction.  Most likely some type of look-through rule would be 
required.123  However, making a look-through rule work would require reporting by third 
party distributing purchasers.  Andrus and Oosterhuis imagine implementation of this sort 
of system in the context of single-factor sales apportionment.124   
 
Getting buy-sell arrangements with third party distributors to be treated equivalently to 
related party distribution arrangements or third-party agency distribution arrangements 
would be challenging.  In theory, a DBRMPA would also need similar look-through rules 
to allocate revenue from sales of intermediate inputs to third party manufacturers.  Ideally 
these sales would be allocated on a look-through basis based on the country of sale of the 
end good into which intermediate goods are ultimately incorporated.  However, because 
this structure is infeasible, Andrus and Oosterhuis recommend treating the place where the 
goods are incorporated into products of the purchaser as the location of sale.125  The sale 
of capital goods raises a more extreme version of the same problem – these are in effect 
the sale of intermediary goods with a long useful life the value of which is then embedded 
in end consumer goods and services.   
 
Andrus and Oosterhuis suggest that to prevent rampant abuse, we would need to distinguish 
between “real” manufacturing and mere re-importation or packaging (this would backstop 
the look-through rule for distributing purchasers).  As they wrote “[t]he location, for 
example, of the final packaging or labeling of products can too easily be manipulated if a 
significant tax advantage results.”  They then suggest the contract manufacturing rules 
(which distinguish manufacturing from repackaging) might be used to address this concern.   
 
                                                 
123 Clausing & Avi-Yonah proposed a look-through rule for unrelated distributors in their single sales factor 
formulary apportionment proposal.  Kim Clausing & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in 
a Global Economy:  A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, Brookings Inst., June 2007. 
124 Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, at 101.   
125  Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, at 100.  See also Harry Grubert, Destination-Based Income Taxes:  
A Mismatch Made in Heaven, 69 Tax L. Rev. 43, at 55-56 (2015).  
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Those familiar with the difficulties in administering and unintended planning engendered 
by the contract manufacturing rules might be concerned about adopting a facts and 
circumstances test for all cross-border transactions, rather than the occasional instance of 
foreign base company sales income.  However, the primary problem is a deeper one:  in 
this case the jurisdiction in which a tax administration would need to audit the question of 
whether real manufacturing had occurred would often be a jurisdiction in which the MNC 
under audit has no physical presence.  And, as with the location of service use discussed in 
IIIB.2.a., tax administrations would again be in the position of auditing one business to 
figure out where taxing rights lie for the profits of an unrelated corporation.  Absent a 
radically improved and streamlined environment for both information exchange and 
international tax administrative assistance, how are the arising enforcement questions 
supposed to be addressed?  Licensing arrangements and franchising structures raise parallel 
but – from an audit perspective – perhaps more complicated questions than those described 
above for 3rd party intermediary sales.126   
 
IIIB.2.c.  Other Methods of Identifying Destination 
 
There may be mechanisms outside historic VAT or income tax practice to identify the 
destination of some goods and services.  Two examples that come to mind are 
pharmaceutical products and technology that has an IP address.  In the pharmaceutical 
industry for non-tax regulatory reasons businesses generally must keep track of the 
destination of their products even when those products are being distributed by third party 
distributors.  An IP address can be used as a proxy for location, so a DBRMPA could 
potentially treat goods that have an IP address as having the destination associated with 
their IP address.   
 
The question that then arises is whether destination can be determined using such non-tax 
proxies for most, some, or only a low percentage of goods and services that generate excess 
returns.  The answer to this question is unclear.  What is certain is that the destination of 
all goods that generate excess returns is not determinable based on piggybacking on non-
tax regulatory rules or relying on IP addresses. 
 
IIIB.2.d.  Relationship Between FDII and any Destination-Based Allocation System 
 
Interestingly, the IRS and the US Treasury are likely to put all the above-discussed 
concepts for determining destination to the test.  New section 250 of the Code (“FDII”) in 
effect establishes a preferential tax rate for income derived by domestic corporations from 
serving foreign markets.  The statutory rules require determining the foreign portion of 
deduction eligible income.  This amount includes income derived from the sale of property 
to any foreign person for a foreign use.  It also includes income derived in connection with 
services provided to any person not located within the United States, or with respect to 
property that is not located in the United States.  Thus, the destination of both goods and 
services must be determined in order to implement the new FDII rules of section 250.  The 
                                                 
126 Some of these difficulties are discussed in Grubert, supra note 125, at 57. 
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IRS and the Treasury will need to write regulations describing how taxpayers should make 
these determinations in the coming twelve months in order to implement the FDII regime.  
Any multilateral organization or foreign sovereign evaluating a proposal for a DBRMPA 
would therefore be well-advised to evaluate the regulatory output of the IRS and the 
Treasury in this regard.   
 
IIIB.3.  Problems with Unitary Approach  
 
As discussed earlier, a DBRMPA relies on the DBRPA with respect to the portion of the 
excess return of the MNC allocated to marketing intangibles.  The DBRPA in turn is not a 
formulary system, because it measures returns at a product line level and provides 
jurisdictions “credit” for higher prices.  However, escaping the formulary label does not 
equate to escaping the related “unitary” label.  The DBRPA calculates most revenues at a 
country level, but it calculates costs on a global consolidated basis, just like the “unitary” 
aspect of formulary apportionment.   
 
An important downside of global consolidation is that it requires a common measure of 
taxable income across jurisdictions.  In other words, one needs a single measurement of 
apportionable income.  That is the “unitary” aspect of formulary apportionment.  
DBRMPA may not require a common measure of gross income, but it would require 
common rules regarding costs.  The most obvious category of costs that need common 
allocation rules are indirect costs.  The problems of indirect cost allocation are familiar to 
US practitioners from the foreign tax credit system and our current debates about the GILTI.  
A DBRMPA would need globally agreed rules about analogous difficult issues.127   
 
Moreover, for the DBRPA to work well, schedules for depreciation or amortization of 
tangible and intangible property, treatment of original issue discount – and perhaps even 
issues like the method used for inventorying costs or the treatment of fines and penalties – 
would ideally be standardized across jurisdictions.  As Julie Roin explained a decade ago 
with respect to formulary apportionment, unitary systems become inadministrable if global 
costs must be measured for purposes of determining income in each jurisdiction, but each 
jurisdiction has its own rules with respect to when those global costs are taken into 
account.128   
 
These issues with the “unitary” dimension of formulary apportionment are well-trodden 
ground.  What observers may not appreciate is that the DBRMPA does not avoid those 
issues.  Indeed, because the DBRMPA requires allocating indirect costs on a product line 
basis rather than a QBU basis, the unitary concerns that require tax harmonization to 
address may be more extensive than under formulary apportionment.   
 
                                                 
127 Cf.  OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶¶ 2.154-2.157 (describing the importance of aligning accounting 
rules in transactional profit splits). 
128  Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promised Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary 
Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 200 (2008). 
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IIIB.4.  Conclusions re DBRMPA 
 
The DBRMPA combines many of the administrative problems of a residual apportionment 
system and an arm’s length system in an attempt to produce a political compromise.  That 
political compromise allocates part but only part of the residual return to market 
jurisdictions.  Replacing the current international tax rules with this system would entail 
substantial institutional transition costs in the US and elsewhere.129   
 
Adopting a system that combines the issues of a residual apportionment system based on 
destination with the issues of an arm’s length system reduces the stakes associated with the 
challenges of each part of the new combined system if and only if the relative share of the 
excess return allocated to each part of the new combined system is clear.  In this regard, a 
relative valuation-based DBRMPA recreates the administrative quagmire we had in the US 
for valuing acquired intangibles prior to 1993, and expands it to every cross-border 
transaction involving an intangible.130  In contrast, a “formulary DBRMPA” would resolve 
this issue by agreeing an arbitrary percentage split of excess returns so as to allocate a set 
percentage of the excess to market jurisdictions and the remainder to the current arm’s 
length standard.  However, the formulary DBRMPA may be subject to the same dynamic 
that manifested itself in connection with traditional 3-factor formulary apportionment in 
the United States.  In other words, jurisdictions are likely to have economic incentives, 
revenue incentives, or both to abandon the agreed split and move towards a larger 
allocation to the market.   
 
Separately, any DBRMPA method – whether “two-sided,” “one-sided,” or “formulary” – 
would face the same issues associated with international tax base harmonization that apply 
to unitary taxation systems, as well as the issues associated with determining destination 
without a credit-invoice system.  Finally, all versions of the DBRMPA would maintain the 
problems of the current arm’s length system for transfer pricing on the other intangibles 
side of the marketing intangibles vs other intangibles divide. 
 
Part IV.  Pairing Inbound and Outbound Minimum Taxes? 
 
This section presents and evaluates a combination of inbound and outbound minimum 
taxes as a solution to the current debate over transfer pricing and the allocation of taxing 
rights as among jurisdictions.  Minimum taxes include traditional CFC-based solutions, 
which rely on relative immutability of corporate residence, and newer ideas that combine 
outbound and inbound minimum taxes.  Such ideas appear to have entered the OECD 
                                                 
129  Roin’s point was about formulary unitary taxation, but a close look reveals that most of the issues are 
related to unitary taxation rather than formulary approaches.  Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 
J. Legal Stud. S61, S78-84 (2002)  (detailing institutional impediments to development of a common income 
tax base). 
130 A “one-sided” valuation method DBRMPA could avoid the problems created by a “two-sided” DBRMPA 
on the one hand and a “formulary” DBRMPA on the other, but in doing so approaches the result of a DBRPA.  
It does so with much more transfer pricing controversy embedded in order to get to that result.   
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debate.  “Minimum effective taxation” is also an issue that Germany has recently raised at 
the most senior levels in European Union policy discussions.    
 
Notably, the GILTI and the BEAT could respectively be described as an attempt to have 
outbound and inbound minimum taxes, or as an attempt to ensure minimum effective 
taxation.  In this Part IV I will suggest that the GILTI and the BEAT can be reimagined to 
suggest a workable alternative for the medium-term future of the international tax system.   
 
I expect the US will continue to describe the GILTI and the BEAT with our current 
acronyms.  However, the reconceived system I describe below is perhaps better described 
as a combination of an outbound minimum tax and something like a “reverse CFC” rule.131  
The basic concept would be to pair some outbound minimum tax regime (a reformed 
GILTI) with defensive measures that would only be applied to multinationals parented in 
countries that do not impose a qualifying outbound minimum tax.   
 
IVA.  Outbound Minimum Taxes 
 
The GILTI is now highly familiar for the participants at this conference.  At the highest 
level, the GILTI requires a US shareholder of CFCs to pay a minimum aggregate US and 
foreign tax on its share of the earnings of its CFCs on a current basis.  Unlike other dividend 
exemption systems, the structure of the regime imposes tax on most CFC income, but does 
so at a lower rate than domestic income.  
 
As a practical matter the United States is likely to maintain some form of this outbound 
minimum tax regime over the medium term.  At the present time the Republican party 
believes it has renewed American competitiveness with its corporate rate cut and hopes to 
protect the basic structure and rates.  Meanwhile, Democrats are proposing to raise the 
corporate income tax rate and the GILTI rate along with it, but have not suggested altering 
the basic architecture of the regime.  That political playing field is unsurprising given that 
at a 50,000 feet level one can describe the GILTI regime as the Obama Administration 
proposal to “Impose a 19 Percent Minimum Tax on Foreign Income,”132 just enacted at 
Republican rather than Democratic rates. 
 
Although the basic architecture of an outbound minimum tax is likely to be a stable feature 
of US international tax law, the technical details of that construct are subject to change.  
The 2017 legislation is legislatively unstable in the sense that various provisions expire by 
                                                 
131 This idea also has some relationship to proposed special measure number five from the BEPS project’s 
2014 public discussion draft on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Actions 8, 9 and 
10).  OECD, Discussion draft on revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including risk, 
recharacterisation and special measures) (2014), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-
draft-actions-8-9-10-chapter-1-TP-Guidelines-risk-recharacterisation-special-measures.pdf. 
132 US Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue 
Proposals (2016).  
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their own terms between 2021 and 2025.  It is politically vulnerable to revision, because it 
was enacted via a party line vote.  Finally, it is technically unstable for reasons having to 
do both with how some provisions are difficult to administer and others may create 
unintended incentives.133    
 
A few examples of political and technical instability of specific features of the current 
GILTI construct are worth mention.  At the political level, Democrats are focusing on the 
QBAI regime, which exempts a small portion of CFC income from the minimum tax, as 
creating (unintended) incentives for offshoring tangible investment and related jobs.134  
Meanwhile, at the technical level, Dana Trier’s paper correctly highlights the complexity 
created by the QBAI regime, as well as the problems created by the QBAI regime’s 
interaction with the treatment of debt. 135   Separately, many commentators view the 
GILTI’s reliance on the existing foreign tax credit and subpart F mechanics to be 
administratively inadvisable.  There are likely more elegant ways to impose a minimum 
tax than building a system based on calculations at the shareholder level using rules written 
for entity level calculations.136  It also is not clear why elements like foreign base company 
sales income, foreign base company services income, and section 956 are necessary 
components of a minimum tax regime.  
 
I view the combination of a stable basic architecture (an outbound minimum tax regime) 
and flexibility as to features and technical/mechanical details of the regime as an 
opportunity for meaningful multilateralism. 137   From a US perspective, the pragmatic 
reality is that GILTI may be reformed to function more effectively, but the basic minimum 
tax concept seems unlikely to be repealed over the medium-term.  From a non-US 
perspective, the key political fact is that the US was historically the biggest impediment to 
a floor to tax competition.  Now the US has in effect embraced such a regime, without 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., Dana Trier, International Tax Reform in a Second Best World: the GILTI Rules (discussion 
draft for this conference). 
134  S. Comm. On Finance (minority), 115th Cong., Trump’s Tax Law and International Tax:  More 
Complexity, Loopholes and Incentives to Ship Jobs Offshore (2018).  Note also that the articulated purpose 
of QBAI was to measure income from intangibles in an administratively simple way and exempt non-
intangible returns from GILTI.  A key motivating principle for the regime was that MNCs without high 
intangible returns should face an exemption system similar to those imposed by the countries of residence of 
most of their non-US competitors.  This policy rationale is coherent, but it is inapposite in a multilateral 
minimum tax regime. 
135 Trier’s paper also illustrates that a QBAI regime is not a natural fit with a German-style interest barrier of 
the type adopted by the United States in 2017.  Trier’s paper correctly treats this problem as a reason to 
question why the US has chosen to exempt a return measured as a percentage of QBAI from its minimum 
tax, rather than a reason to abandon the German-style interest barrier in favor of [describe Action 4 OECD 
proposal], which moved forward in the US in the 2017 legislative process as proposed code section 163(n).  
In the end, section 163(n) was excised from the US legislation as enacted.   
136 Treasury and the IRS will almost certainly smooth out many of the rough edges of the 2017 Act in 
regulations.  But the statutory framework limits their ability to produce a clean system.   
137 Admittedly, as the thorough New York State Bar Report on the GILTI noted, the current GILTI regime 
contains elements of both a flat rate minimum tax on foreign income and an imperfect add-on to the prior-
law subpart F regime.  NYSBA Tax Section, Report No. 1394 on the GILTI Provisions of the Code (May 4, 
2018), supra note 45.  Determining whether Congress intended to enact a flat rate minimum tax or an add-
on is probably unknowable.  What is knowable is that the flat rate theory has a plausible rationale.  In contrast, 
the GILTI as an imperfect add-on to the prior subpart F regime is normatively difficult to defend.     
 WORK IN PROGRESS – COMMENTS WELCOME 
  
 47 
necessarily settling on the details in any permanent way.  For countries that have wanted a 
floor on corporate tax competition and felt the US was an obstacle to such a result, the 
unsettled state of GILTI is an opportunity for meaningful and potentially efficacious 
dialogue.    
 
Two non-American sovereigns that may find a minimum tax proposal attractive are 
Germany and Japan.  It is important to understand why:  these are export-driven economies.  
To the extent source becomes defined as destination, which is the trend we see in the other 
proposals discussed in this paper, these countries’ national interest is to find an alternative 
to a destination-based income tax system.  They and other export-driven economies might 
also find minimum tax systems attractive to the extent that they are concerned that the 
incidence of a destination-based income tax is more similar to that of a consumption tax 
than it is to a residence-based corporate income tax.  The most viable alternative to a 
destination-based income tax is a multilaterally agreed inbound/outbound minimum tax 
regime that supports a version of the residence-based system.   
 
A minimum tax regime that undergirds residence-based taxation is based on concepts that 
all currently exist in the law of multiple countries.  Therefore, it should be easier to agree 
on and implement than a shift to destination-basis taxation.  Moreover, such a regime is 
more objective than trying to ascribe relative value to different kinds of intangibles.   
 
One important problem with any outbound minimum tax regime is that it applies only to 
tax-resident MNCs, and therefore creates incentives to redomicile.  Outbound minimum 
taxes lower the benefits to a resident MNC eroding the domestic tax base.  However, to the 
extent the United States, or any other country, imposes such a tax, and no other country 
does the same, the country or countries imposing the outbound minimum tax on resident 
MNCs discourage corporate tax residence and encourage foreign tax domiciliation for 
multinational enterprises.  Senator Portman’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
study entitled Impact of the US Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs 
persuasively showed that under prior US law “foreign acquirers that hail from more 
favorable tax jurisdictions are able to create value simply by restructuring the affairs of the 
US target companies to improve their tax profile.”138  The United States understandably 
does not want to be in that world, and other countries would not want to be, either.  I 
testified to Congress about evidence that an important medium-term result of pressures for 
redomiciling MNCs out of the US by tax-driven acquisitions of US firms by foreign firms 
would be fewer high-quality jobs for US workers.139  The same would hold true for any 
                                                 
138  Majority Staff of Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, S. Comm. On Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affrs., 114th Cong., Impact of the US Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs 
2, (2015). 
139 Grinberg Senate Testimony, supra note 43.  Importantly, the result appears to hold even with formerly 
US-tax resident corporations that have substantial presence in the United States but change their country of 
tax residency.  Nirupama Rao (formerly part of the Obama Administration CEA) has shown that former US 
MNCs that undertake inversions subsequently develop higher shares of their employees and capital 
expenditures abroad after inversion, relative to similar firms that remain US tax resident.  Nirupama Rao, 
Corporate Inversions and Economic Performance, 68 Nat’l Tax J. 1073 (2015).  As Rao’s paper highlights, 
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country that unilaterally adopted an outbound minimum tax without appropriate defensive 
measures. 
 
Importantly, multiple countries adopting an outbound minimum tax for resident 
multinationals alone also would not in and of itself solve the problems associated with 
cross-border M&A to escape that taxpayer-unfavorable residence country tax net.  Without 
a “defensive measure,” all it takes is one viable corporate headquarters jurisdiction to 
defect and choose not to have an outbound minimum tax for the dynamic favoring 
acquisitions by tax-favored MNCs to take hold.  For that reason, given the fungibility of 
tax residence for business units (which can be acquired), new businesses (which can 
incorporate initially abroad), and multinationals as a whole (which are routinely acquired 
in cross-border M&A transactions) simply differentiating tax burdens based on tax 
residence, without measures to discourage avoidance of a basic residence tax burden, is 
untenable as a policy option. 
 
Relationship of Outbound Minimum Taxes to German Royalty Barrier 
 
In 2017, Germany enacted the Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard to Licensing 
of Rights (German EStG 4j).  This provision of German law restricts the tax deduction of 
royalties and similar payments made to related parties if such payments are subject to a 
non-OECD-compliant preferential tax regime and are taxed at an effective rate below 
25%.140  This rule has a quite targeted scope, but it evolved from a more general German 
interest in proposals to encourage or ensure minimum effective taxation.  The concept of 
encouraging minimum effective taxation at a general level, rather than on an item-by-item 
basis, continues to be of interest to German policymakers, including at the finance minister 
level.141  Importantly, the German idea of minimum effective taxation as it has developed 
in EStG 4j would appear to reflect a country-by-country conception of minimum effective 
taxation.142   
 
IVB.  Inbound Minimum Taxes 
 
The US Congress was cognizant of the problems associated with taxing resident 
multinationals in a harsher way than non-resident multinationals when it enacted the 2017 
Act.  The “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code” discussed the importance 
                                                 
the changes in hiring and investment resulting from inversion are not attributable to the onetime effects on 
the data due to the inclusion of the foreign acquiring firm’s existing workforce and investments.  Rather, 
foreign shares of employment and investment are systematically higher two and more years after inversion, 
relative to the first year after inversion. 
140  See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [German Income Tax Act], § 4j; see also, e.g., EY, German 
Parliament adopts legislation on limitation of tax deduction of royalties and tax exemption of restructuring 
gains (May 2, 2017). 
141 See Elodie Lamer, Germany Wants Progress on BEPS, Minimum Effective Taxation, 91 Tax Notes Int’l 
1246 (Sept. 17, 2018). 
142 See n.40-41 and accompanying text. 
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of “rules to level the playing field between US-headquartered parent companies and 
foreign-headquartered parent companies.”143  In reporting the BEAT to the Senate floor, 
the Senate Finance Committee explained that “the current U.S. international tax system 
makes foreign ownership of almost any asset or business more attractive than U.S. 
ownership… creating a tax-driven incentive for foreign takeovers of U.S. firms… [and] 
has created significant financial pressures for U.S. headquartered companies to re-domicile 
abroad and shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.”144  The Senate Finance Committee’s 
explanation went on to explain that the BEAT was supposed to be an administrable way to 
meet the promise of the framework to level the playing field. 
 
Unfortunately, the BEAT as enacted does not appear to have met this goal.  However, the 
concept of using an inbound tax to defend residence-based taxation is quite rational.  
Importantly, the defense of an outbound minimum tax would work best if undertaken via 
multilateral coordination.   
 
The BEAT that Could Be:  A Reverse CFC Rule 
 
Four high-level changes would be required to convert the BEAT into a useful inbound base 
erosion prevention mechanism that also encourages foreign sovereigns to adopt outbound 
minimum taxes.  First, the BEAT would need to be amended so as not to apply to 
multinationals tax resident in a jurisdiction that imposed a qualifying minimum tax regime.  
The definition of a qualifying outbound minimum tax would presumably follow the 
contours of a multilateral agreement.  Second, the reformed BEAT would need to be 
limited to actual base-eroding payments.  Most importantly this would mean repealing the 
disallowance of foreign-tax credits and NOLs in present law BEAT.  Third, the base 
erosion percentage limitation would need to be excised.  Finally, the BEAT would need to 
be expanded to cover at least the value of intangible property embedded in goods, or 
perhaps to cover goods in their entirety.  As explained below, the last of these is viable if 
the purpose of the reformed BEAT were to incentivize other jurisdictions to adopt 
qualifying outbound minimum taxes, rather than to raise revenue.   
 
The inbound regime (“BEAT 2.0”) described above could be accurately described as a 
“defensive measure.”  The base amount would still be determined by taking the taxpayer’s 
taxable income increased by certain base-erosion items.  As in the current regime, 
taxpayers would multiply the BEAT base amount by a given percent of the BEAT base.  If 
that amount exceeded their otherwise-applicable US tax liability, they would pay the 
difference between the BEAT amount and their regular tax liability.   
 
However, unlike the current BEAT, this regime would apply only to multinational groups 
that were not subject at the parent level to an (internationally-recognized) qualifying 
outbound minimum tax.  As a result, countries whose multinationals operate extensively 
                                                 
143 US Dep’t of the Treasury, Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code 9 (2017).  
144  Senate Finance Committee, Explanation of the Bill, at 391, 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2017/11/tnf-sfc-explanation-of-bill-nov30-2017.pdf. 
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in the US market would have an incentive to adopt qualifying outbound minimum taxes.  
The incentives in this regard would be much stronger if the United States and the European 
Union and/or Japan were to take such steps in a coordinated fashion.  In a multilaterally 
agreed minimum tax regime with coordinated defensive measures, multinational 
corporations would have strong incentives to remain headquartered in key jurisdictions that 
had qualifying outbound minimum taxes and were thus part of the new international 
consensus. 
 
Various criticisms of this approach are available.  Let me address just three.  First, this 
approach would require some degree of agreement with respect to the acceptable outer 
boundaries of outbound minimum tax regimes.  Minimum standards with respect to an 
outbound minimum tax regime represent a certain degree of tax harmonization.  Some 
might fear this would represent a slippery slope towards even further tax harmonization, 
and that such constraints on tax competition are inappropriate.  However, I would suggest 
to such critics that tax sovereignty is a basic interest of national sovereigns, and that a small 
step in the direction of coordinated rules may not in this case be a particularly slippery 
slope.   
 
Moreover, note that the minimum tax regime likely requires much less tax harmonization 
than the DBRMPA.  Inbound minimum taxes used as defensive measures to backstop the 
outbound minimum tax regime require determining some effective tax rate for the 
outbound regimes of jurisdictions that formally impose an outbound minimum tax.  
Otherwise countries could adopt an outbound minimum tax at the appropriate rate on a 
very narrowly defined base. 
 
But note that the harmonized base definition issues are actually less extensive than in the 
DBRMPA.  Unlike in a DBRMPA (or user participation), in the minimum tax structure the 
national rules that determine the base from which the effective tax rate is measured only 
matters with respect to the question of whether a national defensive measure is imposed.  
As a result, the pressures for countries to agree on a shared definition of the appropriate 
tax base are low.  In the minimum effective taxation regime, the base only matters for the 
purpose of measuring the effective tax rate imposed in another jurisdiction, rather than for 
purposes of actually splitting up the tax base.  As a result, inconsistent national definitions 
are fine within some wide margins.  In contrast, in the DBRMPA and under user 
participation, the absence of base harmonization can have consequences in every case, 
because both of those approaches are unitary tax systems.  Consistent definitions are 
needed to split up a base and therefore avoid double taxation.  As a result, the pressures to 
harmonize are higher.   
 
Second, Part IIIB.1. highlights why it is difficult to write regulations that separate 
embedded intangibles from the overall value of a tangible good in an administrable way.  
Sales of products containing embedded intangibles present a challenge for any inbound 
base protection rule that is meant to be WTO-compliant while raising revenue; rather than 
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acting as an incentive for other countries to adopt a regime that is exempt from the inbound 
base protection rule/defensive measure.145   
 
In contrast, if the inbound base erosion/defensive measure rule applies only to 
multinationals that are not subject to a qualifying outbound minimum tax regime, and if 
(for example) the United States, the European Union, and perhaps Japan have all adopted 
such regimes, then “rough justice” that erred on the side of inclusion in destination country 
tax bases would not be a problem.146  Indeed, onerous rough justice would help ensure 
widespread adoption of qualifying outbound minimum taxes.  As more jurisdictions 
adopted qualifying outbound minimum taxes, the treatment of COGS in cross-border 
transactions with corporations’ whose parent entity was tax resident in a jurisdiction 
without a minimum tax would become ever less important.147   
 
Third, some might suggest that the minimum tax solution would not stop some sovereigns 
from separately enacting unilateral measures to ring-fence and tax large US tech firms 
participating in the digital economy.  I have sympathy for this critique.  We are living 
through a mercantilist and politically charged moment in international economic law (and 
the US is not exempt from this characterization).  In the current environment, some 
sovereigns do seem to want a shift of the “digital” tax base, rather than to ensure a single 
level of tax on corporate income.  The minimum tax proposal does not affect a shift of the 
tax base from residence to destination, and does not serve a mercantilist end in the digital 
sector.  Thus, some sovereigns might take unilateral measures to accomplish their desired 
ends with respect to the digital sector on top of a minimum tax.  Indeed, this concern may 
motivate the marketing intangibles proposal. 
 
However, given that the United States already has a GILTI and is unlikely to repeal it in 
the medium term, I do not believe the “but it won’t stop other countries’ digital proposals” 
critique substantially changes the US policy calculus.  Rather, if other sovereigns see 
redeeming features in the basic outlines of the American status quo, that outcome is in the 
national interest of the United States.  This conclusion does not change if it turns out that 
multilateral agreement on a minimum effective taxation regime does not also completely 
stop unilateral efforts by some sovereigns to target the US tech sector.  No proposal 
                                                 
145 In an inbound base erosion regime intended to raise revenue, disaggregation of embedded intangibles 
could be required for cross-border payments associated with the supply in the United States of any good or 
service.  Huge pressure would then exist for regulations attempting such a disaggregation to avoid 
overbreadth. 
146 It may be that such an agreement could not be reached with the EU in advance of March 29, 2019, the 
date for which Brexit is scheduled.  Note also that from a US perspective what would be important would be 
for an agreed defensive measure to be applied by all EU member states at the external EU border.  If freedom 
of establishment constraints prevented application of a defensive measure by EU sovereigns in regard of 
payments to other EU member states, that limitation would not raise any fundamental US policy concern. 
147 Importantly, so long as the inbound minimum tax is intended as a defensive measure rather than a 
meaningful revenue raiser, principled answers with respect to the currently intractable problems raised by 
embedded intangibles and foreign corporations with no taxable nexus under current standards are simply not 
necessary.  Given the technical challenges raised by these two issues, the ability to avoid them is a significant 
advantage.     
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(including the marketing intangibles proposal) can fully stop such efforts in any case; the 
political reality abroad that views the US tech sector with distrust is simply too strong.  
What is important is that an agreement to implement a minimum tax block a multilateral 
agreement on a digital-only proposal, and also that the foreign countries most interested in 
a minimum tax outcome commit (including on a bilateral basis) not to pursue digital-only 
measures.148  In other words, although the tech sector is an important US national interest, 
it is clearly not the only US national interest in the field of international taxation.  Rather, 
our broadest interest should be to stabilize the international tax system generally, ensure 
that its architecture remains principled, provide certainty for all of our businesses, and bring 
our new international tax system more closely into alignment with international norms.   
 
Although a multilateral agreement on a minimum effective taxation regime would not 
necessarily stop every foreign sovereign from enacting tech-specific tax proposals, it would 
likely discourage many sovereigns from doing so.  To provide a simple example, if the 
German government were to agree to a minimum tax proposal as a solution to the digital 
tax question, and commit not to enact a digital-only proposal, it seems unlikely they would 
renege over the medium term.  In my judgment the diplomatic and technocratic political 
culture of Germany is not such that it would agree to a solution to the digital issue that 
involved a minimum tax multilaterally, and then shortly thereafter enact a digitally-focused 
tax.  A similar observation might be made about many governments (consider Japan for 
example).  If the European Commission were to sign on to a minimum effective taxation 
agreement to settle the digital tax debate, it is also unlikely that the letter of the agreement 
would be abandoned.  In that particular case, from a US perspective having both EU 
member states and the Commission commit to an agreement is important.  The US should 
insist at the OECD that the Commission be an independent party to any agreement. 
 
To address any concerns about individual countries behaving perfidiously, the United 
States should consider including a punitive measure in its reformed inbound minimum tax 
(BEAT 2.0) to discourage the imposition of particularly destructive taxes.  For example, in 
my view today’s gross basis turnover taxes on digital business represent a relatively 
transparent mercantilist effort to target US firms.  US law could be structured so as to apply 
the reformed BEAT to jurisdictions that imposed taxes targeted at US MNCs, even if they 
adopted a minimum tax regime.  As a statutory matter one could use section 891 as a model 
in this respect.  Such a tool would be perceived to have legitimacy internationally if it were 
tied to a multilateral agreement on minimum taxation.  International legitimacy (even if 
not complete acceptance) should be an important consideration for those of us concerned 
with reestablishing stability in the broader international economic law environment.149    
 
Finally, one might be concerned that the United States itself might want to abandon the 
minimum tax at a future date.  The US could unilaterally overcome its fiscal challenges 
                                                 
148 In the case of Germany, an important question also arises as to whether there should be a commitment to 
block EU-level digital-only solutions.   
149 More generally, the points above about coordination as to minimum standards for an outbound minimum 
tax regime would not require agreement as to all the details of the inbound minimum taxes (defensive 
measures) enacted by individual countries that are intended to backstop the outbound minimum tax regime. 
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and obtain fiscal leeway to lessen its reliance on our economically inefficient corporate 
double tax by adopting a new revenue source, such as a VAT.  At that juncture a 
multilateral minimum tax regime would function as an unwelcome constraint.  However, 
a new revenue source is not in the offing at this time in the United States.  Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that the political process will soon sanction reducing corporate tax rates by 
increasing individual income taxes.  As a result, anti-base erosion measures will probably 
continue to be needed over the medium term.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The international tax system that emerged after World War II had the important advantage 
of being nestled within a broader world order that, in Henry Kissinger’s classic 
formulation, “had the advantage of uniform perceptions.”150  Countries accepted that the 
United States led the post-war international economic order of the free world.  Almost as 
a minor corollary, countries generally accepted that the United States led the development 
of the transfer pricing regime, too.   
 
In contrast, few observers would claim that today’s international economic climate features 
uniform perceptions.  The current state of international tax affairs reflects the broader 
disarray.   
 
One important goal in this difficult environment should be to reestablish some stability to 
the international tax regime.  Among other things, doing so could contribute to the broader 
goal of stabilizing our system of international economic law more generally.  
 
If medium-term international tax stability is a goal, any answer to the questions raised by 
the digital economy cannot be limited to any definition of the digital economy, because no 
corporate international tax problem is unique to the digital economy.  Moreover, the 
features of the digital economy that proponents of a digital-only solution might point to are 
gradually expanding to encompass the bulk of the economy.  
 
However, the digitization of the economy does force policymakers to confront a basic 
choice between destination-based corporate income taxation and residence-based corporate 
income taxation.  A shift from our residence-based system to a destination-based corporate 
income tax, if agreed to by the major economies, is certainly a viable option.  But moving 
to a DBRPA would require significantly higher levels of information exchange and 
                                                 
150 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 27 (1994).  Not only was the United States the only country with the 
economic might to organize the international tax system of the capitalist world – its capacity to dictate 
international tax rules was part of a broader reality in which, in the Cold War period, the US in effect 
organized most aspects of the economic and military structure of the noncommunist developed world.  US 
tax leadership, like US political and economic leadership more broadly, was accepted in large part because 
of a threat the developed noncommunist world perceived; namely that without US leadership the world might 
fall under Soviet domination.   
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collection assistance than currently exist.  More fundamentally, a shift all the way to a 
destination-based corporate income tax presently seems politically implausible.   
 
Indeed, the current debate internationally does not include a full move to destination-based 
corporate income taxation as an alternative.  Instead there are two proposals that in effect 
split the baby between destination-based corporate income taxation and residence-based 
corporate income taxation.  These are the user participation theory and the DBRMPA.   
 
The latter “compromise” proposal, the DBRMPA, is principled and, at the 100,000 foot 
level, may appear politically attractive.  It does change the balance of allocation of taxing 
rights.  However, the DBRMPA creates a new set of administrative challenges for which 
we may not have solutions, while leaving the problems of the current transfer pricing 
system in place, and adding a new source of fundamental controversy – the appropriate 
split of excess returns between the market and the current transfer pricing system.  These 
issues could play out as between governments and between governments and MNCs with 
respect to every cross-border transaction.  What analyzing the DBRMPA highlights is that 
compromise between a destination-based income tax and a residence-based corporate 
income tax, even principled compromise, is hard to administer.  Splitting the baby is 
probably unwise.  If policymakers wish for a destination-based income tax, they should 
really try to go all the way there. 
 
That said, if policymakers consider the compromise that is the DBRMPA, they should 
abandon the notion of measuring the relative value of marketing and non-marketing 
intangibles and accept a simple formulary split between the two residual return categories.  
It seems to me that in a DBRMPA system, a formulary approach, ideally backstopped by 
mandatory binding arbitration, is the only way to control the extent of tax controversy.  
Note, however, that there is currently no international law mechanism that would easily 
ensure that countries would respect an agreement to a specific allocation of the excess 
return between marketing intangibles and other intangibles.  Bilateral tax treaties are not 
well-suited to enshrining such an approach; a multilateral treaty (not the MLI of the BEPS 
project) might be needed. 
 
In contrast to destination-basis corporate income taxation, a minimum tax regime that 
undergirds residence-based taxation is based on concepts that all currently exist in the law 
of multiple countries.  Therefore, it should be easier to agree on and implement than the 
DBRMPA, because it does not require tackling all the issues involved in a shift to 
destination-basis corporate income taxation.  A minimum tax regime also (perhaps 
counterintuitively) requires less extensive international coordination than a DBRMPA.  
Finally, in a multilaterally agreed regime that included both outbound and inbound 
minimum taxes, multinational corporations would have strong incentives to remain 
headquartered in key jurisdictions that had qualifying outbound minimum taxes.  Thus, the 
weakest point of a residence-based system – redomiciliation and tax-driven cross-border 
M&A – would be addressed.  Compared to a partial move to destination-basis corporate 
income taxation, undergirding the residence-based regime with outbound and inbound 
minimum taxes seems both less disruptive and more administrable.   
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What is the mechanism for getting there?  Success will require discussions around both 
substance and process to take place at the OECD.  Americans must be aware that it will 
not be the sort of discussion the United States tended to have at the OECD a generation or 
two ago.  The United States no longer is the uncontested leader of the capitalist world, and 
it does not have an uncontested leadership position in international tax, either.  Rather, the 
best hope in the 21st century is to use the OECD in international tax the way Metternich 
used the Congress of Vienna in European military affairs in the 19th century – as a 
mechanism to overcome quite significant differences in perspective via a balance of power, 
and in the process (re)build legitimacy, shared values, and a stable equilibrium. 
  
